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Abstract
Third Party Support and Risk Costs in Supply Chain Coordination
Kurt A. Masten
It is broadly accepted that supply chain members which can jointly optimize their
decisions, using techniques such as joint economic lot-sizing (JELS), will always pro-
duce equal or superior total profits than those supply chains which do not cooperate.
In addition to increased profits, cooperation offers other established benefits. The
majority of research has explored the use of coordination mechanisms (e.g. quantity
discounts) to improve on purely competitive (arms-length) arrangements in supply
chain purchase contracts. Though the use of these mechanisms can potentially im-
prove profits, they often fail to offer any substantive guidance in implementing the
proposed solution. Further, the JELS solution proposals often presuppose a spon-
taneous and effective coordination effort led by one or both supply chain parties.
However, research has shown that very little meaningful cooperation occurs in prac-
tice. This thesis proposes and explores the novel use of an expert third party to assist
in coordination and cooperation efforts of a contract-based dyadic (supplier-buyer)
relationship. It is shown that coordination using a third party can, not only ensure
optimal profits for the entire supply chain, but also provide significant contributions
to the extant body of knowledge. These benefits include consideration of intangible
factors such as neutral arbitration and protection of confidential information. An
updated cost model accounts for many costs not typically considered in lot-sizing
problems, including the introduction of the seller’s costs of commitment and contract
costs. Numerical studies via simulation are performed to add insight into the im-
plications of the updated model. Sensitivity and algebraic analyses are included for
selected scenarios.

1Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 The Need for Supply Chain Coordination and Cooperation
There is wide agreement among both academics and practitioners that the future
of free-market competition lies not in company vs. company, but in supply chain
vs. supply chain (Rice and Hoppe, 2001). In such an economy, the inefficiencies of
traditional (non-cooperative) relationships consisting of firms that locally maximize
profits will put all parties in those supply chains at a disadvantage against supply
chains with firms that can jointly maximize profits. There is also broad agreement
that firms within a supply chain which can successfully cooperate with upstream or
downstream partners will have higher potential profits over firms which adhere to
a non-cooperative approach. However, the typical method offered to help achieve
higher profits is through the use of a coordination mechanism with the potential
profits using joint maximization being held as the “ideal” benchmark. This approach
has troubling assumptions and ramifications. First, it assumes that the singular goal
of any coordination effort is increased profits. This is not true. Obviously, every for-
profit firm wants more profits, but other non-monetary benefits are being increasingly
considered by modern firms. Second, it assumes relationships are combative in nature.
For example, consider a contract negotiation between two parties, A and B. Party A,
itself in a weak negotiating position, offers a monetary incentive $x to party B, in
the hopes of driving it to accept new terms costing <$x to B and returning >$x in
increased profits back to A. This is not cooperation, but advanced negotiation. This
brings us to the third and perhaps most troubling ramification, sub-optimality. Any
approach similar to the one described above, which is not uncommon, will not only
2fail to maximize total supply chain profits, but perhaps also fail to garner good will
among the participants.
Let us keep focus on a single dyadic link of a larger supply chain which employs the
use of contracts for purchase agreements. There are a variety of reasons for contracts,
such as securing a fixed-cost supply for the buyer and lot-splitting large batches for
the supplier. It is well-established that in the traditional (non-cooperative) buyer-
supplier relationship, a strong party will use its strength as leverage to gain better
terms and/or price on a contract. In a cooperative relationship, the firms would
ideally work together to establish a policy that is mutually beneficial, including the
maximization of profits for all members. One well-known cost model requiring coop-
eration (rather than a coordination mechanism) is joint economic lot-sizing (JELS).
This scenario of firms coming together in spontaneous and effective cooperation has,
perhaps unsurprisingly, remained elusive in practice despite interest from practition-
ers. The goal of this thesis is to present the problem in detail, consider previously
overlooked aspects of the problem, and propose an implementable solution that ad-
dresses the low rate of success of cooperative solutions. Specifically, we propose the
novel use of a third party coordinator (3PC) to provide expertise and services to aid
in achieving cooperation. It is shown that our proposed solution addresses many of
the practitioner’s concerns that have hindered previous efforts in this regard.
In the first chapter, a general background is provided along with detailed infor-
mation on the scope and assumptions of the problem and the proposed solution. An
illustrative example and some notes on the need for a more complete cost accounting
methodology are outlined as well.
In the second chapter, we review the relevant extant literature on third parties
in supply chains and joint economic lot-sizing (JELS) models. Also in this chapter,
we discuss the related literature on quantifying risks, both to the buyer and the
3seller, for inclusion in the proposed models. The literature review concludes with an
examination of the possible legal implications for close coordination between supply
chain members.
The next chapter is devoted to examining traditionally unquantified risk costs,
such as the opportunity cost of commitment to a contract. Updated cost models in-
cluding these costs are provided for the buyer and the supplier. A numerical example,
for illustrating and examining the concepts developed is provided.
The following chapter focuses on the role, limitations, and consequences of using
a third party as a supply chain coordinator. An updated JELS model with a third
party is presented and various payment options are discussed. Finally, this chapter
includes a set of numerical experiments, along with some selected sensitivity analyses.
The fifth and final chapter concludes this thesis with a summary and closing
thoughts with some potential extensions and possible future research areas.
1.2 Finite Contracts and Infinite Horizon Models
Infinite horizon models as a commonly used research approach offer many advan-
tages. They often result in ease of analysis and interpretation, and are usually easier
to solve implicitly. However, they are rarely realistic. They are especially unrealistic
when contracts and legal issues are involved. Gone are the days of forecast based
“push” ordering systems. Buyers today desire small deliveries at mass-produced
prices. To satisfy both requirements, suppliers must often split large production
batches into multiple, smaller deliveries. In turn, the supplier will require a commit-
ment from the buyer to purchase one or more of these large production batches to
ensure that all parts produced are sold. These commitments require contracts, which
are necessarily of finite duration. Although finite, all contracts considered herein,
unless noted, are of arbitrary length to be determined at the time of optimization.
4We will assume that the item’s demand is stationary and is not expected to end
in the foreseeable future. Should a required contract length be known before the
optimization (and thus the contract signing), such as the case with end-of-lifecycle
and planned design changes, this can be included as an additional constraint in the
optimization model, without loss of generality. Indeed, this is likely to simplify the
solution process. The optimization objective remains the minimization of the average
total relevant supply chain cost per time unit, the same as infinite horizon models.
1.3 Why Introduce a Third Party?
It is a well-accepted fact that firms in a supply chain which can successfully
coordinate their actions and decisions will produce equal or higher profits than those
that maintain a more traditional (arms-length or competitive) relationship (Jeuland
and Shugan, 1983; Lee et al., 1997; Park, 2005; Vereecke and Muylle, 2006; Van der
Vaart and van Donk, 2008; Cao and Zhang, 2010; Prajogo and Olhager, 2012). As
mentioned above, this thesis explores the novel addition of an independent and neutral
third party coordinator (3PC) to assist in coordinating a dyadic (buyer-supplier)
supply chain relationship. The scope of this research is limited to dyadic relationships
since the vast majority of coordination attempts in practice are of this variety (Storey
et al., 2006). The reasons underlying the need for this third party can be seen by
investigating the reasons why coordination efforts often fail.
Collaboration efforts fail for a variety of reasons. Some cite concerns over confi-
dential information being shared (Kelle and Akbulut, 2005), especially if a supplier
also works with a competitor (Storey et al., 2006; Fawcett and Magnan, 2002). Other
collaboration efforts, even those that seem to be working adequately, fail when there
is a change in personnel, such as a purchasing agent that has left the firm (Frankel
et al., 2002). Some efforts fail, quite paradoxically, due to a concern that close col-
5laboration might be a first step towards an undesired merger or buy-out (Sabath
and Fontanella, 2002). Even something as seemingly simple as a lack of a formalized
collaboration agreements has caused numerous efforts to be unsuccessful (Daugherty
et al., 2006). A neutral third party could help overcome these hurdles, as well as
provide other potential benefits, such as conflict resolution, disruption mitigation,
and coordination expertise. For an example of a hurdle crossed, through the use of a
3PC, the buyer and supplier are not required to share sensitive information with the
other party, but only to the 3PC, which will ensure confidentiality. Hence, the buyer
and the supplier may be less reluctant to cooperate.
Neutral third parties are not a new concept. Indeed, they are regularly employed
in various circumstances such as conflict resolution, escrow, or peer-reviewed academic
research. They may act as a mediator, assisting with a solution using persuasion or
logic to converge to a solution agreeable to both sides. Alternatively, the role may be
that of an arbitrator, which is essentially a mediator with the authority to enforce an
agreement that may not be acceptable to both sides. Such a third party may simply
be a trusted liaison, offering a line of communication between disgruntled parties.
Finally, its role may be as an expert consultant providing expertise and guidance,
while considering or investigating competing claims. Reviewing this list, we see that
all of these might be needed at some point between a supplier and buyer in a supply
chain. Currently, firms must peacefully, coercively, or perhaps, even through legal
means, work out all aspects, agreements, and disagreements of their relationship.
Smooth, efficient handling of all collaboration requirements may be too much to
expect without any expert outside help.
Individuals have seemed to grasp what firms struggle to understand. Imagine a
couple, currently living in a rental, on the market for a first new house. They meet
someone at a party who has just secured a new job in another city. The person with
6the new job is anxious to move and offers a good price to the couple. The couple loves
the home and location and makes a counter-offer. The offer is close, but a bit less
than what the seller wants. The couple writes up a contract from a template they find
on the internet. The seller, who has no experience selling a house, is uncomfortable
with all of this and suggests they hire someone to help make the transaction. The
buyers agree on using a local real estate agent with years of experience to assist with
the transfer. The realtor with dual agency rewrites the contract, adds conditions to
the sale, and convinces the buyers to increase the price slightly to come above what
the seller could get from someone else, but still less than the buyers would pay to a
seller with more time. The process is streamlined and the deal goes through quickly
as everyone involved has clear expectations and is spearheaded by an experienced
third party.
Scenarios similar to the one described above are certainly not uncommon. Yet,
if they had acted like the majority of firms, they would have insisted on trying to
work things out by themselves. Expectations of firms can differ greatly, possibly with
undesirable consequences later on, including the loss of future business opportunities.
Considering that many businesses are already using third parties to assist with lo-
gistical needs, it is not a giant leap to have a third party assist with the numbers,
purchase contracts, and actions behind those logistics.
1.4 General Background and Scenarios of Interest
Today’s complex supply chains are commonly viewed as a series of firms, factories,
or agents, together transforming raw materials at one end of the chain to a product
or service delivered to a customer at the other end. We fully expect that each and
every one of these firms along the supply chain will attempt to maximize its own
profits. To accomplish this, a firm will try to minimize its own relevant costs, while
7maintaining standards of quality and customer service. It is well known that such
attempts are likely to lead to suboptimal performance of the whole system. One
proven method to maximize overall supply chain profits is supply chain coordination
(SCC). We note here that “supply chain coordination” can be a somewhat vague term
that now encompasses many different facets of study, including research on areas such
as coordination mechanisms, coordination roles, and empirical studies. Additionally,
the focus of research may be on internal coordination (among or between functional
areas of a single firm, or “intra-firm”) or external coordination between independent
buyers and suppliers (“Inter-firm”).
In this research, we are interested in a specific, but common, scenario where there
is a single supplier and a single buyer which enter into a binding contract for a specified
quantity of parts to be delivered with lot-splitting as an option to lower total supply
chain costs. This process is sometimes referred to as SSMD (single-setup-multiple-
delivery) (Kim and Ha, 2003). Besides the empirical evidence of practitioner interest
in SSMD, commonly cited mathematical justifications for this approach include a
higher carrying cost for inventory for the buyer and greater setup costs for the supplier.
The supplier will make every reasonable effort to match the buyer’s realized demand,
but is limited by its production rate. One of the two firms may be in a stronger
negotiating position and may choose to use it to maximize its own profit. Alternately,
the firms may agree to work together to design a contract that minimizes the entire
supply chain’s average total relevant cost per time unit. If applicable, the joint profit is
split through negotiation or based on industry customs via some external mechanism
or through the help of a third party. The length of the contract time is dependent on
the values of the decision variables in the optimal solution. In fact, the contract size,
and thus the contract length, is an important decision variable in our model.
81.4.1 The Archetypal Scenario
The base scenario consists of two profit-maximizing firms that are potentially will-
ing to work together to improve total joint performance (profit) of the supply chain.
These two firms consist of an upstream supplier and a downstream buyer. The firms
do not compete with each other and will share all relevant information such as hold-
ing cost rates, tooling costs, demand, and production rates if they decide to work
together. Using the shared information, the buyer and supplier can minimize the
average joint total relevant cost over the planning horizon. Note that since shortages
and backorders are not permissible, cost minimization is equivalent to profit max-
imization. If collaboration fails, the party in the stronger bargaining position will
dictate its preferred decisions and the other party will optimize what it can given
the stronger party’s dictated values. The critical decision variables in this cost mini-
mization problem are the total number of deliveries over the life of the contract (n),
the quantity of each delivery (q), and the number of deliveries per production batch
(m). The resulting contract size, nq, is simply the product of the total number of
deliveries and the quantity of each delivery. Similarly, the supplier’s production batch
size is simply mq, the product of the number of deliveries per batch and the size of
a single delivery. Further, to ensure that the supplier is not left with excess (and
unpaid for) inventory at the end of the contract, a constraint is added: n/m ∈ Z+. No
assumption is made on additional business between the two firms, but contracts are
only made for single parts and only one contract may be active on a part at a time.
There may be significant tooling or setup costs for a part, so the supplier is interested
in a purchase commitment from the buyer. The supplier also needs the freedom to
produce very large batches to minimize long-run production costs, but needs a con-
tract to ensure that it is not left with unusable inventory should the buyer attempt
to renege on the contract during its execution. The buyer is interested in a steady
9lean supplier, willing to spread out delivery of large production batches via small but
frequent deliveries. Occasionally, the buyer may be interested in using a contract for
purposes other than lot splitting. For example, this buyer may want to “lock in” a
particular fixed price for the duration of the contract on parts known to have high
price volatility (see Section 3.3 for an in-depth discussion). The exact process for
determining the best decision variables will depend whether the firm in the stronger
negotiating position will use that leverage or if both parties are willing, instead, to
work together jointly. Three possible scenarios that thus arise, are discussed next.
1.4.2 Three Scenarios of Interest
There are three specific scenarios that we are particularly interested in exploring:
1. A non-cooperative supply chain where the buyer has a stronger negotiating
position (“Strong Buyer” or SB)
2. A non-cooperative supply chain where the seller has a stronger negotiating
position (“Strong Seller” or SS)
3. A cooperative supply chain where either the buyer or seller would traditionally
enjoy a stronger negotiating position, but instead employ the services of a third
party to assist in cooperation and arriving at jointly optimal contract decisions
(“Third Party Coordinator” or 3PC)
For brevity, we will refer to each scenario by only its defining participant: SB, SS, or
3PC. In both of the first two scenarios, SB and SS, the stronger party will fully use
its leverage to directly minimize its own costs when making decisions. This will offer
us “worst case” results when considering total supply chain costs. These will also
provide baselines of comparison for the third scenario, 3PC. In practice, we expect
a weaker buyer or seller to offer incentives, such as quantity discounts, to help align
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Figure 1.1: Sequence of Events for a Supply Chain with a Strong Buyer (SB)
the stronger party with its own preferred terms, thus lowering the cost for the overall
supply chain. These mechanisms can be viewed as a non-cooperative reaction to
a non-cooperative player (SB or SS), and are fitting for an arms-length contract.
Non-cooperative coordination mechanisms such as these are outside the scope of this
thesis. In contrast, the approach discussed here applies to firms desiring a closer,
more collaborative, relationship. Additionally, the 3PC scenario guarantees us jointly
optimized decisions, potentially providing the “best case” minimal cost results (given
the conditions discussed later).
To help clarify the sequence of events in each of the three scenarios of interest,
flowcharts are provided in Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3.
In these figures, dotted items indicate the weaker party’s logical response to a
stronger party’s dictated contract terms. These are outside the scope of the current
research but provided here for completeness. For details on the LS term, see Section
3.3.
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Figure 1.2: Sequence of Events for a Supply Chain with a Strong Supplier (SS)
Figure 1.3: Sequence of Events for a Supply Chain Utilizing a Third Party Coordi-
nator (3PC)
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1.4.3 Common Assumptions for all Scenarios
For clarity and ease of reference, a numbered list of assumptions used throughout
this thesis is presented here:
1. Scope is limited to dyadic relationships.
2. Under deterministic market demand each party’s revenue is fixed and the goal
of each player is to maximize its own operating profit per time unit.
3. No planned stockouts or backorders are allowed.
4. All players are rational and are either risk-averse or risk-neutral (i.e. not risk-
seeking).
5. Independence of and no superadditivity among risk, collaboration, coordination,
or competition effects.
6. Possible jointly optimal cooperative policies are a superset of possible non-
cooperative policies.
7. Typical and commonly accepted assumptions for model parameters:
(a) P > D with both deterministic (Production rate greater than demand
rate.)
(b) CB > CS with both deterministic (Part cost to buyer is higher than final
part cost to supplier.)
(c) AS > ZB with both deterministic (Supplier’s setup cost is greater than
buyer’s per-delivery cost.)
8. Supply chain agreements enforced by purchase contract.
9. Payments are made on-time (i.e. no credits or penalties considered).
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10. Lot-splitting is allowed to facilitate small delivery quantities.
11. Supplier not forced to hold excess stock at the end of the contracted period.
12. Inflation is either negligible or factored into each payment so that the time-value
of money is not taken into account (i.e. no discount factors).
Assumption 1 defines the focus of the research to “Supplier/Buyer” relationships. To
avoid confusion, this terminology will be universally preferred over alternative pairs
of dyadic descriptors such as “Manufacturer/Supplier” or “Seller/Reseller”. Further,
unless otherwise noted, we will assume that the supplier is also a manufacturer with
limited capacity that produces the item in question in batches. However, without
loss of generality, this could in practice be a middleman that purchases rather than
manufactures directly. This limiting of scope to dyadic relationships is justifiable
since true multi-echelon relationships rarely exist in practice (Fawcett and Magnan,
2002). Assumption 2 merely states that all players are motivated by maximization of
their own profits. Assuming fixed revenue, no stockouts, and no backorders (assump-
tion 3), we will utilize the common simplification of achieving maximum profit by
minimizing cost. Assumption 4 declares that all players will behave in a predictable
(rational) manner and will act in accordance with preserving their long-term viabil-
ity (not risk-seeking). We state that superadditivity is not allowed in assumption
5. This is both realistic and required as a basis of later inferences. Additionally,
we assume independence between risk costs since interaction effects are expected to
be negligible. In the unusual case that a large interaction is expected, additional
or combination of terms can be considered. In assumption 6, we state that jointly
cooperative policies are a superset of non-cooperative policies. This can be easily jus-
tified if we recognize that in an arms-length or traditional coordination mechanism
(e.g. quantity discount) scenario, individual players limit possible policies based on
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their own profit (cost) requirements while in a jointly coordinated scenario, a cen-
tralized decision maker has no such restrictions on policy creation and can always
consider every possible non-cooperative policy when minimizing costs. Assumption
7 lists various common and apparent assumptions on the nature of the parameters
used in the cost model. Production rate must be higher than demand rate to ensure
feasibility. A rational supplier will pass on the part costs plus its own margin on all
sold items, making the part cost higher to the buyer than the supplier. Note that
there is no assumption placed on hB and hS since there is no a priori justification that
the supplier’s holding cost per unit per time unit (hS) must be less than the buyer’s
analogous cost per unit per time unit, hB. However, it is commonly assumed that
as we move up a supply chain towards raw materials, fewer value-added steps and
holding cost rate components (e.g. labor) are invested into the parts; thus we expect
but do not require hB > hS. The last in the list under assumption 7 tells us that
the supplier’s cost of setup is greater than the buyer’s contract cost, another common
and intuitive assumption. Assumption 8 states that a contract will be the vehicle em-
ployed to enforce agreements between the players in the supply chain coordination.
We further assume that there is no predefined time unit for this contract (which is
determined by the decision variables) and that any arbitrary addition can be added
to this contract to stipulate the terms of the negotiation. Assumption 9 informs us
that monetary transfers happen on-time and in such a way that the time-value of
money is not of concern to any player. To reflect the needs of modern supply chains,
we will assume (as stated in assumption 10) that each production batch may be split
into multiple delivery lots (i.e. lot-splitting). Assumption 11 details that a rational
supplier will not agree to a production schedule that could potentially leave it with
unsold parts at the end of the contract. Of course, this is a conservative assumption
and may be dropped if negotiated (and compensated). This assumption is addressed
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in all presented models and numerical examples by enforcing a requirement that there
be an integer ratio of deliveries to batches (n/m ∈ Z+). Simply put, there should be
an integer number of production runs per contract. This constraint will guarantee an
even “matching out” of part deliveries with part production. The final assumption
allows us to disregard inflationary factors. This is equivalent to dealing only with
“today’s dollars” at the time of contract signing. In practice, an agreement can stip-
ulate appropriate inflationary correction factors during contract execution, without
affecting any results or conclusions from this research.
1.5 More Comprehensive Cost Accounting
Traditionally, joint economic lot-sizing (JELS) problems account for holding costs
(hB, hS), per-shipment transportation/receiving costs (ZB, ZS), per-batch setup costs
for the supplier (AS), and one-time contract costs to the buyer (AB). With the early
assumptions of short-term or small-volume contracts, the model seemed appropriate.
There are a few problems with this model that become clear after removing such
assumptions. First, the model ignores any one-time contract costs to the supplier.
The probable reason for this is it would introduce a new decision variable to the sup-
plier, making implicit mathematical solutions cumbersome. Next, without a cost that
increases with the length of the contract, the contract quantity for any unbounded
contract will increase without limit as fixed costs are minimized with longer com-
mitments. Experience and logic tell us that this is unreasonable and unrealistic, so
something needs to added to the model to address this. These factors are known
as the “costs of commitment”. Some recent models have added a buyer’s cost of
commitment (LB), but no analogous cost has been introduced for the supplier.
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1.5.1 Costs of Commitment
Prices are often volatile in industry, especially those reliant on commodities. Con-
tracts set prices for the length of the contract. We will assume that inflation costs are
either negligible or accounted for in the terms of the contract. Depending on the busi-
ness environment, perhaps we might expect slow, quick, or unpredictable advances
in technology that would lead to price decreases. In more volatile markets, such as
those closely tied to commodities, the buyer may wish to lock in a longer contract to
take advantage of current low prices. This represents the second of two cases in the
scope of this paper where we might expect a negative component to the commitment
cost. In practice, this is often viewed as a “switching cost”, where the commitment
is considered the normal relation and a potential deviation or defection is considered
a cost.
The cost minimization objective naturally entails balancing the costs of the sup-
plier with the costs of the buyer. The commonly accounted costs include setup costs,
delivery costs, ordering costs, and some opportunity costs. However, the only oppor-
tunity cost typically included in existing research is the opportunity cost of capital,
which can be estimated based on factors such as returns on investment (ROI) or
interest rates. On the other hand, estimating the cost of contract commitment, a fre-
quently forgotten opportunity cost, can be much more complicated. Various factors
play a potential role in estimating the true cost of committing to a contract. An ob-
vious upper limit to this cost is the complete loss of all contracted funds and perhaps
some associated administrative, logistical, disposal costs, and legal fees. On the other
extreme, the lower limit to this cost is zero. Indeed, this is what is typically assumed
in much of the extant literature. The problem with the latter assumption is that the
only way for this commitment cost to actually be zero, or even negative with price-
locking, is if there is no cost or loss associated with creating or breaking contracts,
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including, for example, discarding unusable product or tooling cost liability. If we
keep this assumption, but include net positive one-time costs to the buyer, our only
conclusion when minimizing the average cost per unit will be to commit to an infinite
contract, a clear contradiction that has previously been mentioned (Kelle et al., 2003,
2009). Researchers have included other assumptions or limits to ensure the mathe-
matical tractability of the model and to obtain optimal solutions implicitly. These
simplifications are often based on time or lot-size (Huang, 2004). A more realistic
model without these simplifications requires consideration of the cost of commitment,
which is a goal and motivation for this research.
1.5.2 Buyer’s Commitment Cost Example
An intuitive starting point for considering the cost of commitment can be under-
stood from the following hypothetical scenario. Consider a buyer, an OEM, which
makes electrical panels, contacts a manufacturer of custom switches to provide parts
for a new design. Prototypes are produced and all engineering specifications are
finalized and released. Other functional areas such as Quality Control and Manufac-
turing are confident of the new product. Marketing realistically anticipates demand
of 10,000 panels a year, with each panel requiring one highly customized switch. As
part of the normal new product launch, the buyer’s purchasing agent meets the sales-
person for the switch company to negotiate a contract. To cost-effectively produce
the large quantities of switches required, the supplier requires some very expensive
tooling, but is willing to waive the normal tooling cost, if the buyer agrees to a five
(5) year commitment. The buying agent, having met with all the various concerned
functional managers, is quite confident that this will be fine, since the typical product
life cycle in this industry is about 10 years. The contract is signed and deliveries begin
as scheduled. One year later, new federal regulations are rushed in place after a few
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unrelated, but high-profile, accidents. However, the unique switch fails to meet the
new regulations as currently designed, so a major redesign is required. The switch
producing company is not capable of producing the newly redesigned switch. The
OEM is still committed to 40,000 undelivered switches on the contract that they can-
not possibly use. Depending on the terms of the contract, this sudden end of demand
potentially leaves the buyer “on the hook” and potentially responsible for all parts
remaining on the contract (produced or not) and could become a very large cost to
the buyer. This is one realization of the cost of commitment and is discussed in detail
in Chapter 3. Had the buying agent accounted for the probability of a sudden end
of demand, there would be a cost associated with each additional unit committed to
and the buying agent might prefer to pay for some or all of the tooling up-front rather
than commit to a longer contract.
1.5.3 Supplier’s Commitment Cost Example
Let us revisit the switch example presented above. As before, a buyer commits to a
five (5) year contract of 10,000 switches per year. However, in this scenario, no federal
regulations are changed which cause an end of demand event to the buyer. Rather,
let us suppose that the unique switch requires the use of tellurium, a “rare earth”
metal with historically stable prices. Tellurium is also used in high-efficiency solar
panels, which were not very common at the time the contract was made. After a quick
and significant shift to “green” technologies by many countries and individuals, the
demand for high-efficiency solar panels has soared. As a result, the price of tellurium
has more than doubled in the first two (2) years of the contract. The supplier can still
make the switches, but now makes no money and will soon lose money for every switch
it ships. If the supplier had balanced the potential costs of committing to a larger
contract with the benefit of guaranteed business, it might have made concessions to
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the buyer to split the high tooling costs rather than use it as leverage to gain a longer
commitment.
1.6 Illustrative Example
In order to demonstrate the financial need and benefit of a joint optimization, at-
tainable through use of a 3PC, an illustrative case is now presented. In this illustrative
example, we will examine the ramifications of having a supplier in an extremely strong
negotiating position that can set the terms of the contract. The following parameter
values are used for the example:
Table 1.1: Illustrative Scenario Parameters
Parameter Value
P 4000 units per year
D 2500 units per year
ZB $22.5 per shipment
AB $125 per contract
CB $10 unit cost
rB 0.125 per year
LB 0.03 per year
ZS $22.5 per shipment
AS $150 per production batch
CS $4 unit cost
rS 0.1 per year
LS 0.03 per year
hB = rB ∗ CB
hS = rS ∗ CS
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Extended parameter descriptions may be found in Appendix A. An expository
discussion on the parameters LB and LS may be found in Section 3.3. All dollar
amounts may be assumed to be in 1000’s.
By examining each party’s optimal decisions for number of deliveries per contract
(n) and number of deliveries per batch (m) for a given delivery quantity (q), we can
calculate the resulting costs for the buyer, the supplier, and the combined (joint) cost.
The presentation of the models and their results used to calculate these costs is left
to a later section.
Given the above described scenario, the strong supplier of this supply chain will
create a contract with q=873, minimizing its annual cost at $559. However, this
quantity forces the buyer to deviate greatly from its preferred delivery quantity of
294, resulting in an apparent cost increase of $243 per year. Even if the buyer was
in a position to offer a per unit price premium (a relatively unheard of practice) to
incentivize a change in q, the buyer would still have no knowledge of the supplier’s
internal cost structure and can only guess at acceptable incentives for the Strong
Supplier.
Alternatively, if the two parties agree to the services of a neutral third party (3PC),
the internal costs, still confidential from the other party, can be jointly optimized by
the 3PC to provide the optimal decision variables based on the total costs. The 3PC
will set the supply chain’s decision variables to the jointly optimal settings (q=396,
n=4, m=4 ), resulting in a joint cost of $1437. This 11% savings ($173) is split
between the parties via extra payment from the buyer to supplier. Pareto optimal
payments from buyer to supplier range from $53.5 (supplier minimum to accept) to
$226.5 (buyer maximum to give). We expect the third party coordinator to take a
portion of these savings as remuneration with the remainder split between buyer and
supplier. For example, using actual dollars, with a fee set at 10% of savings and
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Figure 1.4: Illustrative Cost Curves for Selected Scenario with a Strong Supplier (SS)
agreement to evenly split savings, the 3PC would be paid $17,300 with the buyer
and supplier each receiving $77,850 additional profit. The disbursement of funds is
detailed in Table 1.2.
If we expand this illustrative example to include the reverse situation of Strong
Buyer, we can compare the various scenarios. Table 1.4 summarizes the optimal q, n,
and m and related results for three possible scenarios: SB, SS, and 3PC. Note that
the 3PC policy has the lowest total cost, as expected. In this example, the jointly
optimal q, n, and m (as well as nq and mq) are all bounded by the SB and SS optimal
decisions, which is common, but certainly not guaranteed. We can also note that this
example reflects the classical case of a buyer that desires multiple small deliveries and
a supplier that prefers fewer, but larger, deliveries.
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Table 1.2: Strong Supplier Costs (Benefits) in $1000’s After Joint Optimization with
3PC
Total Costs Strong Supplier Jointly Optimal Difference Side Payment Net
Buyer 1051 824.5 (226.5) 148.65 (77.85)
Supplier 559 612.5 53.5 (131.35) (77.85)
3PC - - - (17.3) (17.3)
Supply Chain 1610 1437 (173) - (173)
Table 1.3: Strong Buyer Costs (Benefits) in $1000’s After Joint Optimization with
3PC
Total Costs Strong Buyer Jointly Optimal Difference Side Payment Net
Buyer 808 824.5 16.5 (30.45) (13.95)
Supplier 660 612.5 (47.5) 33.55 (13.95)
3PC - - - (3.1) (3.1)
Supply Chain 1468 1437 (31) - (31)
Table 1.4: Optimal Decision Variables and Related Results
Optimal SB SS 3PC
q 294 873 396
n 5 2 4
m 5 2 4
nq (Contract Size) 1470 1746 1584
mq (Batch Size) 1470 1746 1584
Contract Length (Years) 0.59 0.70 0.63
Total Cost ($) 1468 1610 1437
% Coordination Savings 2.1% 10.7% -
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The literature review is split into four sections. The first section addresses liter-
ature covering the justification, roles, and benefits of third-party coordination. The
next section covers the literature establishing and supporting the general model to be
used throughout this thesis. The third section begins with the foundations of supply
chain risk and is further divided into two parts: the first covers literature discussing
opportunity and flexibility costs affecting the buyer while the second part looks at
the literature alluding to the costs affecting the supplier. The fourth and final section
explores the literature recognizing the oft-overlooked potential legal issues involved
with the close coordination of a buyer and supplier. The scope of this last section
will be limited to laws of the United States.
2.1 Third Party Coordination of the Supply Chain
In the same paper in which the JELS model is introduced, Goyal (1977) proposes
a method for sharing between a buyer and supplier, the increased supply chain profit.
The method shown is to allocate the new costs in proportion to the respective non-
cooperative solution costs, with a side payment based on the actual costs observed
in the joint solution. In the numerical example given by Goyal, the joint costs are
reduced from 925.71 to 881.82 via jointly optimal decisions. Details from the example
are replicated and expanded below in Table 2.1.
Although at first it appears a fair disposition of costs, a few problems with this
methodology are soon apparent. First, even though a strong buyer is assumed, us-
ing the proposed proportionality method, the bulk of the savings are passed to the
supplier since the supplier in this example has inherently higher costs in the non-
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Table 2.1: Goyal’s Method of Splitting Profit Gains
Category Supplier Buyer Total
Non-cooperative Costs (Strong Buyer Assumed) 657.41 268.30 925.71
Cost as a % of Total 71.02% 28.98% 100%
Cooperative “Allowed” Cost per Goyal’s Method 626.24 255.58 881.82
Realized Costs with Joint Optimal 563.49 318.33 881.82
Side Payment to Match “Allowed” Costs -62.75 +62.75
Realized Net Savings 31.17 12.72 43.89
cooperative scenario. Second, in a non-cooperative scenario where the buyer is pre-
sumed to be the strong player that will attempt to minimize its own costs, the supplier,
as it increasingly deviates from its optimal, will be saddled with ever higher costs,
further increasing this percentage. Finally, firms with high costs (or, more cynically,
reporting high costs) are rewarded with a larger percentage of the savings. This might
present a conflict of interest or perhaps a disincentive to find cost savings which will
then be shared with the other “undeserving” party. This allows us to consider the
absurdity of a scenario with a very strong buyer purchasing goods from a supplier
with high costs where the strong buyer only receives a small fraction of the gains
from coordinating after going to the trouble of coordinating and divulging its cost
structure to the supplier. Further, the buyer, if it is foolish enough to agree, would
have almost no incentive to reduce receiving, ordering, or holding costs, as the vast
majority of these savings (if shared) would go directly to the supplier!
Due to concerns such as these, sharing the additional profit in a supply chain
via coordination was also examined by Jeuland and Shugan (1983) and extended
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by Weng (1995). Jeuland et al. discuss a few possible methods of splitting this
profit, including bargaining and quantity discounts after negotiation. The authors
note that cooperation will yield the highest possible total profit, but assume this
can only be possible with joint ownership (vertical integration) or the presence of
a centralized decision maker. The concept of a centralized decision maker is then
ignored. In a taxonomy of recent coordination models, Sarmah et al. (2006) observe
that a mechanism for the sharing of added profits is rarely included. They also note
that most of the studied models assume complete information sharing between parties
and ignore issues such as conflict resolution.
Some of the literature has investigated or assumed that the stronger party will
act as the centralized decision maker. Not many works have considered an outside
decision maker. One notable paper that has considered a third party is Bitran et al.
(2007) where the authors propose hypothetical “maestros” and “mini-maestros” to
help coordinate the supply chain. They cite some case studies of firms currently
filling the role. However, upon closer inspection, these firms turn out to be little
more than middlemen that can source inventory from multiple suppliers as needed to
provide extra flexibility. Another study of note is Zacharia et al. (2011), who look at
the increasing roles played by third party logistics providers (3PLs).
The majority of the supply chain coordination (SCC) and supply chain integra-
tion (SCI) literature approaches the problem as either a “hard numbers” numer-
ical/mechanism based problem or as a “soft savings” empirical problem. This is
supported by numerous reviews and taxonomies that have failed to find almost any
research that crosses categories (Benton and Park, 1996; Thomas and Griffin, 1996;
Maloni and Benton, 1997; Munson and Rosenblatt, 1998; Goyal and Gupta, 1989;
Kanda et al., 2008; Arshinder et al., 2011). The analytical supply chain coordina-
tion literature rarely uses empirical support for anything more than motivation, while
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most of the empirical research glosses over quantification and division of coordination
savings, choosing to focus instead on the less tangible benefits. These “soft” bene-
fits are numerous and well established by multiple sources (Park, 2005; Vereecke and
Muylle, 2006; Van der Vaart and van Donk, 2008; Cao and Zhang, 2010; Prajogo and
Olhager, 2012). They therefore deserve consideration in coordination policies.
Despite both quantitative and qualitative justifications that should be increasing
coordination, multiple studies have found surprisingly low success rates of firms at-
tempting some form of integration (Sabath and Fontanella, 2002; Storey et al., 2006;
Bititci et al., 2007). For example, Sabath and Fontanella (2002) found that only 17%
of companies employ SCI practices. In a joint survey by Supply Chain Management
Review and Computer Sciences Corporation (SCMR), it was reported that 44% of
the sample had structures in place to facilitate buyer-supplier coordination and col-
laboration. However, only about 35% of such initiatives were classified as at least
“moderately successful”. Further, research has shown that some company cultures
have the effect of discouraging individuals from attempting collaboration (Ireland
and Bruce, 2000; Barratt and Green, 2001). Finally, as assumed in almost all of
the coordination mechanism-based literature, there exist powerful firms that will be
non-cooperative partners, using their power to unilaterally gain at the expense of the
other party (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). In some of these cases, where there
is no prospect of cooperation, the available mechanism-based policies (e.g. quantity
discounts) may need to be used. However, this appears to be the exception rather
than the rule, since collaboration is a high priority goal for many managers (Fawcett
and Magnan, 2002; Wognum and Faber, 2002).
The reasons for these collaboration failures are varied, but a few causes are cited
multiple times. One is a lack of a clear leader of the supply chain. Another oft-cited
reason is low managerial ability or understanding (Lambert and Cooper, 2000; Bal-
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lou et al., 2000; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002; Holweg et al., 2005) or experience
(Fisher et al., 2000). Often, there are conflicting incentives and processes between
the members. Firms that are usually only concerned with profits find it difficult to
transition to a collaborative focus where compromise and trust must be given a value
not directly reflected in the product cost (Barney and Hansen, 1994; Khanna et al.,
1998; Das and Teng, 2000). Other times, firms are victims of their own efficiency.
Larger firms, those that would benefit most from a successful joint venture, typically
have many divisions and functional departments, many of which need to come to-
gether for a successful collaboration effort. This complexity and size of organization
can, paradoxically, hinder cooperation (Gerwin, 2004; Fawcett et al., 2012). When
coordination fails, parties will usually resort to what they know best, non-cooperative
arrangements (Zand and Sorensen, 1975; Lehoux et al., 2011). Simatupang and Srid-
haran (2002) outline how a more powerful supply chain member will use its leverage
to the detriment of the supply chain as a whole. Ryall and Sampson (2006) find in
a study of 52 alliances that many firms have used legally unenforceable clauses in
contracts. However, they also find that these clauses, which offer no true legal or
monetary protection from a partner’s opportunism, lay out expectations and act as
a blueprint and facilitator of cooperation.
The business need for a third party to assist in the coordination of the supply
chain members was established in an article by Bitran et al. (2007). The authors
propose hypothetical “maestros” and “mini-maestros” to assist in the coordination of
the supply chain. They are characterized as neutral third parties with the power to
control supplier selection as needed. They include references to a few case studies of
companies currently playing such a role. However, even if this third party had the
ability to hold parts inventory from one or more suppliers, some recent studies (Ton
Hien Duc et al., 2010; Hassanzadeh et al., 2014) have shown that a 3rd party ware-
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house does not mitigate the bullwhip effect, a typical coordination goal. This thesis
will presume efforts that are more in line with the type of point-of-sale information
exchange explored by Metters (1997); the implementation of which can readily be
assisted via third party intervention.
2.2 The Current Joint Model
The joint economic lot size problem, later referred to as just JELS or JELP (Baner-
jee, 1986a), was first proposed by Goyal (1977). Goyal uses a simple lot-for-lot model
which ignores the production rate (by assuming negligible production or purchasing
time) when calculating the average supplier holding cost. The goal in this integrated
model is to minimize the total variable cost by calculating the optimal time between
orders (t*) and the optimal number of orders per set-up (K*). The optimal time be-
tween orders is solved from the first order conditions as a function of K (see below).
Goyal suggests an iterative search solution with K(t*)=1,2,3... to find the lowest joint
total relevant cost (JTRC), and then using this to find t*. The remaining parameters
have been updated to be consistent with the notation adopted in this thesis.
JTRC =
√
2D(ZB +AS/K(t∗))[hB + (K(t∗)− 1)hS ] (2.1)
t∗ =
√
2(ZB +AS/K(t∗))
D[hB + (K(t∗)− 1)hS ] (2.2)
An interesting difference in this model to current models is that the solution here
is solved as an optimal time between orders, rather than optimal order quantities
(which is now standard). Of course, if we assume a deterministic demand rate, the
optimal time between orders approach yields equivalent results with t∗ = qJ/D. Also
of interest is the concept of splitting a production lot into an integer number of
deliveries. Being an infinite horizon problem, there is a presumption that future
orders will always be placed. This is certainly not a conservative assumption, as this
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offers no disincentive to overproduction by the supplier, which may leave unsellable
product in their inventory, which then becomes an unaccounted for cost in the model.
However, if the buyer commits to the optimal K orders at the beginning of production,
this risk is negated. This commitment and its associated costs will be discussed in
much more detail later.
The more modern joint model, based on finding optimal order quantities, was
introduced by Banerjee (1986a) as a lot-for-lot policy with a finite production rate
and extended by Goyal (1988) to allow for multiple orders per production set-up.
Unfortunately, this model assumes somewhat unrealistically that all production be
completed at the manufacturer before the first delivery can be made. This deficiency
was rectified by Lu in a very generalized solution allowing for multiple buyers and
shipments before the production run was complete (Lu, 1995). At roughly the same
time as Banerjee’s JELS model, Monahan (1984) showed the optimal discount pol-
icy to coordinate a lot-for-lot, infinite horizon model. Again, rather unrealistically,
this model assumes the supplier has instantaneous production capabilities and, there-
fore, no carrying costs. Banerjee (1986b) showed his model to be a generalization of
Monahan’s model. Joglekar (1988) generalized Monahan’s model for both finite pro-
duction and multiple orders per setup. Although arrived at by different methods,
for a single-buyer, single-supplier scenario with equal sized shipments, Joglekar’s and
Lu’s models are equivalent. This can be seen by comparison of the provided vendor’s
average inventory level, the most critical addition to these models, detailed in Table
2.2.
Additional costs and just-in-time (JIT) lot-splitting are added to the model by
Banerjee and Kim (1995) and Kim and Ha (2003). Hill (1999) later provides the opti-
mal production and shipment policy for the single-buyer, single-supplier JELS model
with arbitrary shipment sizes. An example of a solution with arbitrary shipment sizes
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Table 2.2: Equivalence of Vendor’s Average Inventory in Two Models
Lu, 1995 Joglekar, 1988
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is a policy for four deliveries of sizes 100, 300, 500, and 800 spaced by 3, 9, 15, and
24 days, respectively. However, the author admits that the resulting policy with ar-
bitrary sizes is “less likely to be of practical interest.” This concern is exacerbated by
the general move away from “push” systems to pull-based JIT systems where small,
but steady and predictable material flow is valued over small cost savings. In the
scope of this thesis, the next significant addition to the standard JELS model arrived
in 2003, when Kelle et al. (2003) introduced a new cost factor (LB) to account for the
opportunity and flexibility cost to a buyer for the purchase commitment, discussed
next.
The literature on JIT is well-established, going back many years and dealing with
many topics. Supply chain coordination (SCC) has also received much attention in the
last 25 years. A cursory search of the literature produced approximately 1000 articles
referring to both JIT and supply chain coordination. Adding “opportunity cost” to
the search yields fewer than 50 papers, with most of these addressing the opportunity
cost of lost sales and holding inventory or cost of capital. Relatively few papers can be
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found which address the opportunity cost of commitment in JIT based supply chain
coordination. The most notable of these is the above mentioned Kelle et al. (2003),
which introduces the concept of a buyer’s opportunity cost into the JELS model and
is a major motivation for this research. This concept solves a mathematical quandary
in the model, which would otherwise drive the joint optimal contract quantity to
infinity. Huang (2004), using work based on Salameh and Jaber (2000) as well as
Kim and Ha (2003), incorporated random yield into the optimal decision, but without
consideration to the above mentioned buyer’s commitment cost. Kelle et al. (2009)
combines Huang’s random yield consideration with the opportunity cost concept of
Kelle et al. (2003). Cachon (2003) thoroughly explored SCC with contracts for profit
maximizing individual firms, but not in cooperative, jointly optimized environments
such as the one discussed here.
2.3 Supply Chain Risks and Mitigations
Before examining particular supply chain risks unique to either the buyer or sup-
plier, it is helpful to establish a framework and perspective of all supply chain risks.
An abundant and robust literature exists which examines risks and their mitigation
in the supply chain (see for e.g. Svensson (2002); Jüttner et al. (2003); Tang (2006);
Colicchia and Strozzi (2012)). In 1997, one of Toyota’s critical suppliers was badly
damaged by fire and was unable to supply parts for a long period. This forced a
shutdown at some of Toyota’s plants for two weeks with estimated lost sales of 70,000
vehicles and $195 million in cost (Nakamoto, 1997; Norrman and Jansson, 2004).
Chopra and Sodhi (2004) provide a chilling example of two telecom companies, Nokia
and Ericsson, which took different supply chain approaches with drastically differ-
ent results. Nokia employed a traditional multiple supplier approach while Ericsson
took what would be considered by most, a more modern, single-sourcing approach.
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A catastrophic fire at a supplier’s plant stopped production at a common supplier
to both firms. Nokia quickly switched to alternate suppliers with little loss while
Ericsson experienced $400 million in lost sales. Naturally, the stoppages carried for-
ward in the supply chain to the final retailers. Ericsson suffered losses as both buyer
and supplier. The authors go on to point out that most firms have plans to address
frequent low-impact disruptions, but many have no plans for rare high-impact events
such as the catastrophic fire mentioned above. Ericsson’s reaction and corrections
after this event are outlined in a paper by Norrman and Jansson (2004). Inventory is
a common buffer for the prior type of risk, but of course it is unrealistic to expect a
firm such as Ericsson, selling a short lifecycle product, to hold on to $400 million (or
more) in excess inventory (“just-in-case”). Therefore, other measures are required.
Examples involving bankruptcy, earthquakes, floods, labor strikes, and even terrorism
are common. Chopra and Sodhi (2004) and Tang and Tomlin (2008) list categories
of risks and common mitigators for each. These were supplemented with information
from the above taxonomies, combined, and recompiled to Table 2.3.
Looking down the “Mitigators” column, we can see a common theme for many of
the categories: using a mix of flexibility, capacity, and inventory to handle short to
medium term risks and redundancy or ad-hoc solutions in the case of catastrophic
or financial problems. “Stress testing” or “what if” thought experiments are offered
as a tool to help address and minimize risks. Another interesting observation is
that capacity and inventory are both risks and mitigators. However, they are also
mitigators to each other, but this still logically implies that most suppliers will have
to choose to accept at least some inventory or capacity risk.
Jüttner et al. (2003) propose a framework for approaching supply chain vulner-
ability and risk management. They simplify the common strategies for risk miti-
gation into four broad categories: avoidance, control, cooperation, and flexibility.
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Table 2.3: Categories of Risk and Their Mitigators
Risk Category Example(s) Common Mitigator(s)
Delay Shipping or Order Delays Capacity and Inventory
(Balancing and Buffers)
Disruption - Natural or
Man-Made
Natural Disasters, Strikes Redundant Suppliers
System (IT) Computer Virus Frequent Backups
Demand - Forecast
Errors
Bullwhip Effect, Unanticipated
Demand
Lean, JIT, Information
Sharing, CPFR, Inventory
Demand - Pricing Errors Mismatched Inventory to Demand Flexible Pricing
Intellectual Property Proprietary Information Lost Own and Maintain
Equipment at Buyer
Procurement/Supply
Cost
Exchange Rate Change, Price
Increases
Financial Hedges, Contracts
Receivables Customer Default on Credit Large Customer Base
Inventory Obsolescence, Perishables Pooled Inventory, Fewer
SKUs, Postponement
Capacity Excess Capacity (and Capital
Investment)
Flexibility (Overlapping
Resources)
Capability/Process High Defect Rate Statistical Quality Control,
Inspection
Supply Commitment Long Lead Time Prevents
Adjustment to Current Demand
Multiple Suppliers
Behavioral Firms Gaming Ordering Systems Order Visibility, Corrective
Actions
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Avoidance-based mitigation is a pass/fail test made prior to any cooperation efforts.
Control-based mitigation options encompass many forms of tweaking the major de-
cision variables in a supply chain, ranging from vertical integration and inventory
buffering to capacity buffers and contract stipulations. Cooperation-based mitigation
options include joint efforts focusing mainly on information sharing and visibility.
Flexibility-based mitigators typically resort to production postponement and sourc-
ing options.
2.3.1 Risk Costs Unique to the Buyer
Kelle’s 2003 model allows for three decision variables in the model solution, as
opposed to the typical two. These variables are n, the number of deliveries per
contract, m, the number of deliveries per production batch and q, the size of a delivery.
Thus, the size of a contract is nq and the size of a production batch is mq. Previous
models, based on an infinite horizon, typically assumed either n=1 (lot-for-lot or
generalized with m ≥ 1) (Banerjee, 1986a; Goyal, 1988), n=m (lot splitting or “single
setup, multiple deliveries” (SSMD)) (Hill, 1997; Kim and Ha, 2003), or an arbitrary
limit such as time (e.g. annual) or quantity (e.g. 5000 units per contract). Kelle
notes that without a cost on undelivered goods, the size of the contract (when n
is not restricted) will approach infinity since average order costs are minimized as
n → ∞ (Kelle et al., 2009). Since an infinite contract is obviously unrealistic and
mathematically intractable in a finite (albeit arbitrary) horizon problem, Kelle adds a
cost that is proportional to ordered product not-yet-delivered, denoted LB. There is
a similarity between this order commitment cost and the cost of capital. Rather than
a cost of capital committed to on-hand inventory, LB reflects the cost of future capital
tied to the commitment of units-yet-to-be-delivered (Kelle et al., 2007). Huang (2004)
added random yield consideration to the JELS model without consideration of LB.
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Kelle et al. (2009) added the LB commitment cost to Huang’s model. This cost is
more recently discussed by Masten and Banerjee (2014) and Masten and Kim (2015).
An intuitive next step is to consider the supplier’s cost of commitment (denoted as
LS for consistency).
2.3.2 Risk Costs Unique to the Supplier
The literature focused on opportunity and flexibility costs to the supplier is ex-
tremely sparse; but there is some relevant research in the area. Van der Vaart
and van Donk (2008) highlight in a review of empirical literature that the supplier’s
perspective is largely ignored in the existing literature. As an exception to this, Hill
et al. (2009), investigate the effect of a buyer violating expectations and eroding trust
in the buyer on the part of the supplier. They also found that this erosion of trust
was not always apparent to the buyer. Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) discuss the value
of a contract in discouraging opportunism of a partner. There is also some research,
mainly from the accounting literature, which explores the costs of unused capacity
(Brausch and Taylor, 1997; Popesko, 2009).
2.4 Legality of Close Coordination in the United States
Whenever we consider separate, independent firms working closely together to
increase supply chain profits (and thus gaining a certain advantage over the com-
peting supply chains), we need to consider whether we run afoul of any antitrust or
anti-competitive laws. Jeuland and Shugan (1983), in a highly-cited work, note that
legislation such as the Clayton Act, Sherman Antitrust Act, and other similar laws
may actually increase prices for the end consumers due to the fact that most of these
laws implicitly assume that having many retailers and many suppliers will benefit
consumers more than vertical integration can. The authors also note that having
36
multiple competing coordinated supply chains could potentially produce better out-
comes for consumers. Perhaps the most important and most discussed legislation
is the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 (Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526), which
prevents an upstream party from offering different terms to resellers in the same re-
seller class except for a few special conditions, one of which is when a difference in
cost can be justified (Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; Kintner, 1970). Quantity discounts
appear to clearly and easily fall under this justification most of the time. However,
while it is typically considered acceptable to offer a quantity discount schedule to
buyers/resellers, The U.S. Supreme Court found it illegal to offer quantity discounts
in cases where only a few very large buyers are capable of taking advantage of highest
parts of the discount schedule: “Theoretically, these discounts are equally available
to all, but functionally they are not” (Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt. Co.
, 334 U.S. 37 (1948)). The ruling goes into more detail:
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly
clear that Congress considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could
secure a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the
large buyer’s quantity purchasing ability. The Robinson-Patman Act was
passed to deprive a large buyer of such advantages except to the extent
that a lower price could be justified by reason of a seller’s diminished costs
due to quantity manufacture, delivery or sale, or by reason of the seller’s
good faith effort to meet a competitor’s equally low price.
The court’s opinion on this matter was reaffirmed as recently as 2006 with Volvo
Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. (546 U.S. 164 (2006)),
which is still of obvious concern. However, in that case, the burden and amount of
damages was severely limited and a there was a shift in the general tone towards the in-
terpretation of this and other antitrust laws to be more focused on competition rather
than competitors. Indeed, there is quite a vocal opposition to the Robinson-Patman
Act in the economics literature. Some of this literature claims that enforcement of
this act in on the wane for multiple reasons (Blair and DePasquale, 2014), making the
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typical firm less likely to be acutely aware of its presence or alter its pricing policies
in deference to it.
Sellers offering custom or unique parts have no concern from this law since there
is only one possible buyer/reseller. There remains an open question as to the legality
of a very close coordination and/or cooperation when identical parts are sold both
within and outside an agreement of close coordination. There is a potential issue
with close information sharing when two competing retailers both share information
with a common seller. If this information is visible to the other buyer, this could risk
violating antitrust laws (Lee and Whang, 2000).
More than 60 years ago, in a highly-cited article, Spengler (Spengler, 1950) made
a well-reasoned argument that vertical integration is inherently not anti-competitive
and should not be subject to antitrust laws. He argues that horizontal integration
and arrangements, not vertical integration, is the possible source of reduction of com-
petition. Further, it has been argued more recently that the competitive advantage
gained from supply chain collaboration is insufficient to warrant antitrust litigation
(Hoyt and Huq, 2000). Finally, a notable lack of supply chain coordination lawsuits
making it to a high court for a violation of antitrust laws should lend some comfort
to prospective supply chain partners.
The above review of the literature draws attention to a number of gaps and defi-
cient areas in the extant body of knowledge. For example, few works have seriously
considered the benefits that a third party decision maker can contribute to a sup-
ply chain’s policy decision process. From examining the legal viewpoint, we see the
potential regulatory need for protecting sensitive information, a benefit that a third
party may provide. Considering the limited research that has been made in regards
to commitment and risk costs in JELS models, especially from the supplier’s perspec-
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tive, there is a clear need for further study. We attempt to fill some of these research
gaps with the work presented in the following chapters.
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Chapter 3: Quantified Supply Chain Risks and Mitigators
This chapter examines a commonly neglected aspect of JELS models. Called
“soft costs” by some and opportunity or commitment costs by others, these risk
costs are often ignored in favor of the more easily quantifiable costs such as carrying,
inspection, and shipment costs. This is not surprising since it can be difficult to justify
costs based on lost opportunities. These costs are often probabilistic or predictive
by nature and can be more subjective than objective. For example, predicting the
likelihood of disruptive legislative or technological changes may be even more difficult
than predicting natural disasters such as hurricanes or floods.
The first section of this chapter discusses the concepts and defines the terminology
to be used in reference to supply chain risks. The next portion reiterates the impor-
tance of including these costs in any proposed solution. The third section proposes
a general framework for the inclusion of any and all known risk costs. The following
segment updates the buyer’s cost model to include risk costs for the buyer. This
section also includes an example quantification for a potential catastrophic demand
disruption. The final section updates the supplier’s cost model to include risk costs
for the supplier.
3.1 Concepts and Definitions
Concerns, opportunities, and commitments are all just different applications of
the concepts commonly known as risk or probability. A concern is the perceived
risk of “something going wrong.” This, of course, is an extremely general description
that offers little tangible or quantifiable substance. Often nothing more than “gut
feelings”, concerns may or may not be based on a personal experience or could sim-
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ply manifest themselves from uneasiness at an unfamiliar situation. One can easily
imagine an executive or purchasing agent that openly voices distrust for all small
suppliers after suffering the effects from a contract or two that relied on small compa-
nies that went bankrupt during a contract. Note that we can fairly quantify the risk
of a supply disruption associated with a small supplier, which may be higher than
that pertaining to a large supplier; but we can not fairly quantify risk costs biased by
personal experience or perception. Likewise, concerns based solely on inexperience or
uneasiness need to be similarly discarded.
Unlike general and vague concerns, which are inherently unquantifiable, the op-
portunity and commitment costs considered below and in the rest of this thesis are
assumed to be measurable or can be estimated, based on larger industry trends or by
specific research. An opportunity cost is the quantified risk of missing out on “some-
thing better” had the contract commitment not been made. For example, imagine a
buyer locking in the price of a part at $100 to later find another supplier that could
sell the same part for $80. The “missed opportunity” for a lower part cost in this
example is straight-forward and easily measurable. An analogous opportunity cost
is applicable to a supplier that chooses to sell an item at a price below fair market
value.
Similarly, a commitment cost is the quantified risk of being committed to parts re-
maining on a contract, yet-to-be-delivered, should the firm no longer wish to continue
the contract for some reason. Possible reasons might include regulatory or technolog-
ical developments which significantly alter demand for the product or material costs.
Mathematically, and perhaps intuitively, there is little need to differentiate between
opportunity and commitment costs. Therefore, these terms will henceforth be used
interchangeably.
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Contract requirements or preconditions, including clauses and stipulations, are
an attempt to mitigate or lessen some of these potential losses. For the purposes
of this research, if the risk is completely eliminated by legal means, contract clause,
insurance or other method, it is no longer a risk that needs to be considered in our
model. Periodic costs to mitigate these risks such as insurance premiums or law-
firm service retainers may be easily and directly included in the cost minimization
process. Unless these costs are dependent on the decision variables, they will not
affect the optimality of our decision variables. However, profit sharing schemes using
each supply chain member’s total periodic cost would be affected, such as the method
described by Goyal (1977), which was discussed earlier.
Not only is it important to include opportunity and commitment costs for the
sake of fair cost accounting by the supply chain members, it is important to include
these costs for mathematical tractability, which is discussed next.
3.2 Importance of Considering Opportunity and Commitment Costs
At the beginning of this chapter, proper opportunity and commitment cost ac-
counting was introduced as a matter of fairness and completeness to the model. From
a mathematical view, if no increasing cost penalty is assigned to increasing contract
sizes in the original JELS models, contract sizes are unbounded. This was shown by
Kelle et al. (2003), but is also intuitive when one considers that one-time costs like
AB are minimized by the largest possible contract size if there are no terms which add
cost with an increasing number of deliveries or increasing contract size (nq). Consid-
ering only the holding, delivery, and setup costs, the total relevant cost to the buyer
per time unit is:
TCB(q, n) = hB
q
2 + ZB
D
q
+AB
D
nq
, (3.1)
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which is clearly decreasing in n, implying an open-ended contract. Models using this
formulation can only avoid the unbounded problem by stipulating a given contract
period or quantity. However, if we wish to eliminate this binding and potentially
unrealistic assumption, we need to add one or more terms which increase in n. But
first, it is beneficial to explore some reasons that unbounded contracts rarely if ever
exist in practice and to add support and justification for the inclusion of these new
terms in the model.
We know that given enough time, almost everything changes. This is true from
a cosmic scale all the way down to an ant hill. Narrowing our focus to only supply
chain concerns, we know that prices will rise or fall over time based on the season,
demand, or even harder to predict events like wars or trade embargoes. Production
capacities will change as a supplier invests in new capabilities or accepts contracts
from other parties. Technology and innovation will change demand for electronics.
Weather events such as droughts in the short-term and climate change in the long-
term will affect production capacities. As consumers, we intuitively use these ideas
to help determine our purchasing behavior. For example, we may buy less fruit when
we know the peak of the growing season is approaching and prices will drop. A
very similar example is the ability for consumers to “lock in” natural gas prices. We
consider a great many of the same issues, such as: the length of the commitment,
the price difference with the common price, the potential for the price to change (up
or down) before the end of the commitment period, a value in reducing uncertainty
about the future price. These factors are weighed and added up to help us come to
a decision.
It is for the above reasons that both parties rightly consider the length of com-
mitment when signing a contract. Currently, this decision is made through a mental
calculation of “soft” costs and risks or by a more rigorous mathematical cost account-
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ing or, more likely, through some combination of the two. To transform a “soft” factor
into a concrete cost, we need to add terms to our cost model quantifying each factor.
Examples and updated cost formulations are given in the following sections.
3.3 A Model with Quantified Risks and Benefits
One way in which we can model commitment costs is to imagine the fallout from
an undesirable scenario and weigh it by the likelihood that it will happen. In general
terms, we can quantify this expected cost (or benefit) of a commitment concern per
time unit as follows:
E
[
Risk Cost
T ime Unit
]
= Likelihood
T ime Unit
∗ Cost or Benefit
Occurence
(3.2)
or mathematically as:
E
[
Risk Cost
T ime Unit
]
= LBVB(n, q) for the buyer and
E
[
Risk Cost
T ime Unit
]
= LSVS(m,n, q) for the supplier.
We can interpret L as “likelihood” (i.e. probability) of an event and V as “value”
(cost or benefit) of an event. As a basic example, consider a buyer of wooden pallets
that is located in a flood prone area. Each year (the relevant time unit), there is a 5%
chance of a large flood that will float away or otherwise ruin all on-hand inventory.
Pallets are shipped q at a time and cost $50 each. Combining the probability of a
flood with the expected cost of a flood event, we get:
E
[
Flood Risk Cost
T ime Unit
]
= LBVB(n, q) = LBCB
q
2 = .05 ∗ $50 ∗
q
2 (3.3)
where LB = .05 and VB(n, q) = CB q2 is the value of the buyer’s expected on-hand
inventory. Note that VB(n, q) is a generalized value function, with any number of
delineations, and n is unneeded in this example. This value term can be updated to
reflect additional inputs such as insurance, shipping, and recovery costs as appropri-
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ate. The expected flood risk cost as a function of the decision variable q is then added
to the total cost calculation to help determine the optimal decision variable values.
In this case, with costs increasing in q, the inclusion of this cost will tend to push
the optimal q lower. In the above example, only q was required, but if we consider
a risk that covers multiple deliveries, such as a contract commitment, n would need
considered. Similarly, for the supplier, inclusion of m in the value function is required
to account for certain risks such as on-hand inventory obsolescence.
Based on our previously stated assumption of independent commitment costs, we
can model multiple concerns as a simple summation of individual expected costs,
giving us a total risk cost per time unit of:
E
[
Total Risk Cost
T ime Unit
]
=∑
i
LBiVBi(n, q) for the buyer and
E
[
Total Risk Cost
T ime Unit
]
=∑
i
LSiVSi(m,n, q) for the supplier.
By stating the risk cost in this manner, we reduce and generalize any of a host of
different possible commitment concerns to a single formulation. This has the added
advantage of lending a straightforward interpretation that can be readily adopted by
practitioners. In fact, a similar technique known as the Altman Z-score (Altman,
1968) is commonly employed by agents today to assist with contract decisions.
Edward Altman used discriminant analysis on 66 firms to create a “Z-score” that
could be used to predict bankruptcy. Much research has since refined and built
upon the initial findings to assist practitioners with predicting the likelihood of a
supply chain partner’s bankruptcy. Though usually intended for a buyer to judge a
potential supplier, there is little stopping a supplier from evaluating a potential buyer.
Here, a supplier would judge the per time unit likelihood L of a potential buyer going
bankrupt using the Altman Z-score and multiply it by the cost of a bankruptcy event.
A potential expected cost for this event is the loss of on-hand inventory plus half of
the one-time contract costs, which can be quantified as:
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E
[
Risk Cost
T ime Unit
]
= LSVS(m,n, q) = LS
[
CS
mq
2
[
1− D
P
− 1
m
+ 2D
mP
]
+ OTCS2
]
. (3.4)
A recent addition to the literature focused on supply chain disruption is the con-
cept of a focus on Time-to-Recovery (TTR) put forth by Simchi-Levi et al. (2014).
Under this approach, specific sources of disruption are ignored in favor of focusing on
the recovery process. TTR is the amount of time that is required to resume normal
operation after a significant event, such as flooding or a fire. Correction may require,
for example, a change in supplier or new machinery. This process is ideally conducted
on the entire supply chain to rank the nodes of the network and find the largest po-
tential weaknesses. Should one of those weaknesses be the party to a contract, it is
essential to account for that risk to be incorporated in the total relevant costs.
3.4 An Updated Cost Model for the Buyer
Generalizing the various costs or benefits of commitment to the above buyer’s
relevant cost equation produces:
TCB(n, q) = hB
q
2 + ZB
D
q
+AB
D
nq
+
∑
i
LBiVBi(n, q). (3.5)
As an example of this generalized form, we consider a scenario in which a buyer
is faced with two costs of commitment. First, the buyer may be liable for unneeded
units should the demand end before the contract is completed. Second, the buyer
commits to the unit price at the time of the contract commitment and is concerned
with a potential change of unit price to ĈB. From this information, the following
equation can be formed from Equation 3.5 above:
TCB(n, q) = hB
q
2 + ZB
D
q
+AB
D
nq
+ LB1CB
nq
2 + LB2(ĈB − CB)
nq
2 . (3.6)
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Here, LB1 is the contract commitment cost rate that simply increases the buyer’s
total relevant cost proportionally with the size of of the contract. The value function
describes the monetary value of half of the contract size. This can be interpreted
as an insurance cost for the event that, due to unforeseen circumstances, we no
longer need the remaining units on the contract. This intuition behind this cost
component is described in much more detail below in Section 3.4.1. Similarly, LB2
is the commitment cost (benefit) rate that we will be lose (gain) the opportunity to
miss a price decrease (increase) for the remaining portion of the contract. Note that
this may be positive or negative depending on the anticipation of the direction of
likely price changes. A positive LB2 will tend to lower the buyer’s preferred contract
length while a negative LB2 will tend to increase it as the buyer wishes to either avoid
a unit cost increase or capture a unit cost decrease.
Since a change in unit cost also affects the holding costs, we may for completeness
include those potential changes into our value function for LB2 . Since rB(ĈB−CB) q2 is
the expected per time-unit increase in holding cost due to a price change of probability
LB2 , we can incorporate this into the previous equation to produce the following cost
equation for the buyer:
TCB(n, q) = hB
q
2 + ZB
D
q
+AB
D
nq
+ LB1CB
nq
2 + LB2(ĈB − CB)
q
2(rB + n). (3.7)
If the probability of these events are sizable, a joint distribution may be employed
to more accurately reflect the potential costs. However, due to the subjective nature
of some of these particular costs, it may be much more appealing to the practitioner
to maintain modularity of the equation by assuming a negligible joint probability. In
the example above, a catastrophic demand disruption will negate the concern of a
future price increase since the remaining contract can be paid off immediately in such
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an occurrence preventing a future change in price. This might not hold true in the
reverse, since a price increase does not logically prevent a demand disruption. Again,
a joint probability could address this scenario if it is deemed to be a considerable risk.
3.4.1 Example Quantification of LB: Model for End of Demand During
Contract Period
In the previous example, LB1 is given simply as the contract commitment cost rate.
This is a cost rate that reflects the wariness of buyers in committing to large contract
quantities. It also plays an important role mathematically in preventing infeasibility
when deciding on the policy decisions for an arbitrarily long contract. Intuitively,
it makes sense that a buyer will hesitate before committing to large contracts, and,
not surprisingly, this is confirmed by empirical evidence (Kelle et al., 2007). Some
of the possible reasons for a buyer’s commitment cost have been outlined previously.
However, one area in particular, demand disruptions in supply chain coordination,
has received little attention (Qi et al., 2004). The remainder of this section is focused
on addressing this neglected area by detailing the ramifications to the buyer of a
sudden end of demand event during the contract period.
Given a buyer facing the following total relevant cost structure per time unit:
TCB(q, n) = hB
q
2 + ZB
D
q
+AB
D
nq
+ LBCB
nq
2 , (3.8)
most of the exact parameters are easy to calculate for the practitioner. For example,
ZB may be the transit and incoming inspection costs per delivery and AB the legal
fees for forming a contract. The holding cost per unit, hB, is calculated by multiplying
the given wholesale cost, CB, by rB, a well-established number typically provided by
the firm’s accounting function. However, there is little to no guidance available for
an appropriate LB value. When introduced by Kelle et al. (2003), the only exposition
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given was explaining that this parameter represents “the cost rate of losing flexibility
per unit dollar amount contracted but not yet received.” They proceed to use a value
of 3% without explanation or justification for it.
Rather than adopting an arbitrary commitment cost rate, it is beneficial to have
some basis for this value. This is possible by quantifying a realistic risk of com-
mitment. To do this, suppose a regulatory or design change instantly removes the
demand for all undelivered items under contract during the contract’s execution. If
this happens, the buyer may be held liable for compensating the supplier for all parts
remaining on that contract. The consequence is that the buyer will face a cost with
some probability (say p) or, alternatively, insure against this event. This is a plausible
scenario that a practitioner can readily understand.
Given that the buyer can either estimate or know from past events that there is
a probability p over the interval of a time unit of an acute end-of-demand (EOD)
event, the buyer can add this expected cost to the cost structure when computing
the optimal policy decisions. One straightforward interpretation of this p value,
assuming an annual basis for costs, is “equally likely throughout the coming year,
there is a probability of p for obsolescence of the contracted part.” However, since it
is not immediately obvious how to correctly account for this cost, an explanation is
provided below.
The duration of a contract should no EOD event occur is nq
D
. For a constant,
continuous risk of an EOD event with probability p, the duration of the contract is
nq
2D , half of the contracted quantity. Putting these together, we can find the expected
length of the contract:
p
nq
2D + (1− p)
nq
D
= 2(nq)− p(nq)2D =
nq(2− p)
2D . (3.9)
This gives us an expected number of units consumed during the contract:
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nq(2− p)
2D ∗D =
nq(2− p)
2 = nq
(
1− p2
)
. (3.10)
Thus, the number of unconsumed units for the contract is nq − nq
(
1− p2
)
= pnq2 ,
with an expected cost of CBpnq2 , where CB is the unsalvageable per unit cost (CB -
salvage value) with 0 < CB ≤ CB and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. For CB ≈ CB, we may also add an
implied constraint of p nq2D ≤ 1, or equivalently, nq ≤ 2Dp since a logical buyer would
never commit to a contract quantity larger than the expected life of the contracted
part. For a small p, this would be expected to rarely limit the contract quantity.
For a large p, the implications and importance of considering an EOD in determining
an optimal contract size would be considerable. Of course, this implied constraint
does not need to be explicitly added to the mathematical programming since it will
already be used in determining an optimal nq. Adding the above calculated cost of
leftovers to the buyer’s total relevant cost equation yields:
TCB(q, n) =
hB
q
2 + ZB
D
q
+AB
D
nq
+ LBCB
nq
2 + CBp
nq
2 =
hB
q
2 + ZB
D
q
+AB
D
nq
+ (LBCB + pCB)
nq
2 . (3.11)
Should there be very little salvage value (i.e CB ≈ CB) as might be expected for
unique or custom purchases, we can clearly see the equivalence between LB, the cost
of commitment, and p, the probability of obsolescence. The important implication
of this finding is that many practitioners may not be able to justify an appropriate
LB, but may be able to justify a value for a risk of obsolescence, p, through either
experience or group consensus.
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Based on the above analysis, a self-insured company will need to be prepared to
pay 100% of the remaining contract costs (CB nq2 ) with probability of p over each
time unit. Or, if insured externally, the buyer will always pay αpCB nq2 , where α is
the insurer’s premium rate and α > 1, with the conservative assumption of a profit-
seeking insurer.
3.5 An Updated Cost Model for the Supplier
A typical accounting of the relevant costs to the supplier is:
TCS(q,m) = hS
mq
2
[
1− D
P
− 1
m
+ 2D
mP
]
+ ZS
D
q
+AS
D
mq
, (3.12)
which accounts for holding, delivery, and per-batch costs (See e.g. Golhar and Sarker
(1992); Banerjee and Kim (1995); Kim and Ha (2003); Kelle et al. (2007); Masten and
Kim (2015)). More recently, the concept of a cost of commitment has been discussed
and explored for the buyer (Kelle et al., 2003; Masten and Banerjee, 2014). However,
there is ample reason to believe that the seller would also be interested in capturing a
cost of commitment. For example, a supplier of copper or aluminum ore would surely
hesitate before allowing a buyer to “lock in” unusually low prices for an extended time
period. Another example would be a supplier that commits to a low-profit product
to take advantage of unused capacity, but does not want to lose this capacity in the
long-term should a higher-profit product (contract) become available in the future.
The vast majority of the literature referring to a supplier’s opportunity cost is in
terms of some monetary measure (e.g. lending or trade credits). Kelle and Akbulut
(2005) lists and implies some potential hazards for the supplier when cooperating,
including the loss of confidential information, investment costs, and losing business
from your partner’s competitors. Since we allow for offsetting negative costs (bene-
fits), we need to also note the advantages such as point-of-sale (POS) information and
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Table 3.1: Example Delineations of VSi(m,n, q)
VSi(m,n, q) Risk Cost Description
CS
nq
2 Contract commitment
CS
mq
2
[
1− D
P
− 1
m
+ 2D
mP
]
Obsolescence of on-hand inventory
(P −D)VS Excess (unusable) capacity
simplified financing. Just like the aspects contributing to the cost of commitment for
the buyer, most of these are also inherently difficult to quantify.
The supplier’s total relevant cost per time unit can be more completely given as:
TCS(m,n, q) = hS
mq
2
[
1− D
P
− 1
m
+ 2D
mP
]
+ ZS
D
q
+AS
D
mq
+
∑
i
LSiVSi(m,n, q), (3.13)
or with a discrete accounting of one-time costs:
TCS(m,n, q) =
hS
mq
2
[
1− D
P
− 1
m
+ 2D
mP
]
+ ZS
D
q
+ AS
D
mq
+
OTCS
D
nq
+
∑
i
LSiVSi(m,n, q). (3.14)
Examples of VSi(m,n, q) are presented in Table 3.1. These represent ad hoc cost
structures that can potentially vary by factors such as industry or product.
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Chapter 4: Third Party Coordination of the Supply Chain
Small companies rarely have the time, the resources, the negotiating power, or the
desire to implement advanced inventory coordination systems. These small firms may
be in a particularly weak negotiating position compared to their much larger trading
partners and be forced to accept unfavorable contract terms. Unused capacity or
low cash flow may push some to resist any action that may antagonize the other
party. Meanwhile, larger firms have the resources and negotiating power required
to push for an effective cooperative solution, but it has been shown that firms in a
dominant position are more likely to use available leverage to maximize their own
individual profits, rather than advocating a jointly optimal policy (Simatupang and
Sridharan, 2002). Even firms roughly equivalent in size may hesitate to fully cooperate
for various reasons. Protecting proprietary information such as market size is seen
as particularly important (Fawcett and Magnan, 2002; Verespej, 2002). The double
marginalization problem provides us with a “worst-case” example of this inefficiency
in action. In this famous scenario, multiple monopolies (or other price-setting firms)
introduce considerable losses and inefficiencies due to the locally-optimizing behavior
of the buyer and supplier.
As Cachon (2003) notes, there is much literature on theoretical models but “little
guidance on how the theory should now proceed.” As established in Chapter 2, much
of the extant coordination literature presupposes either a spontaneous agreement
between buyers and sellers to cooperative and collaborate effectively (in models for
joint optimization) or a strong party that forces the weaker party to attempt supply
chain coordination via some form of mechanism or inducement, such as a quantity
discount. Even if both firms wish to cooperate, it is not clear which party should
manage the supply chain (Storey et al., 2006).
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A practical and novel solution that addresses many concerns and issues is through
the introduction and use of a neutral and expert third party coordinator (3PC). A
few entities already exist in the marketplace with similar (albeit less grand) goals.
These third parties refer to themselves using terms such as “3PL+” or “4PL1 ”. Firms
using the 3PL+ moniker typically come from the logistics industry and use a “hands-
on” approach to address inventory coordination issues. One popular technique is
storing inventories near the shipping points to reduce delivery lag times. Firms called
“Fourth-party logistics” or 4PL typically provide outsourcing or consulting services
to the members of the supply chain. Larger and famous companies, such as UPS,
DHL (Exel), and Con-way (Menlo), have evolved to offer a wide variety of services,
including 3PL (third-party logistics), LLP (lead logistics provider), 4PL services, or
other ad-hoc solutions (Lieb, 1999; Doll et al., 2014; Lieb and Lieb, 2016). For those
supply chain parties that are currently unable or unwilling to cooperate, the use of
a third party coordinating expert could allow for an improvement in overall supply
chain performance.
The entity acting as a third party coordinator (3PC) may in practice be a 4PL,
LLP, or 3PL+. This would potentially require an increase in responsibilities presently
administered. However, this evolution of duties from 3PL to 3PC is apparently quite
manageable and perhaps even natural, as supported by this shift having already begun
at one major 3PL+ (Zacharia et al., 2011). Of course, not all logistics and shipping
companies wish to expand their current business to include these new services and
the added responsibilities (Fabbe-Costes and Roussat, 2011).
In the first part of this chapter, we expand upon the role that an expert third
party would need to play and the responsibilities that need to be assumed by a 3PC.
1It should be noted that “Fourth Party Logistics” (and 4PL) was once a registered US trademark
of Andersen Consulting in 1996 but abandoned in 1998. The usage is now commonly accepted to
refer to any fourth party logistics provider.
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In the following section, we discuss how limits exist to the range of situations in
which gains may be had by adding another, ostensibly unnecessary, profit-seeking
participant. Some less obvious consequences of having a third party coordinator are
also considered.
The third portion of this chapter lays out the required updates to a current joint
model to reflect the more complete cost accounting established in Chapter 3 with the
addition of a third party coordinator. This section also explores some of the problems
along with a potential solution for third party remuneration.
The next section of this chapter is devoted to a numerical example. In this classical
term-by-term investigation, we explore the component influences of the model param-
eters on the resulting optimals for the three cases of Strong Buyer, Strong Seller, and
3PC (Joint). It is the goal of this numerical example to “open the book” for the
much more detailed, simulation-based, numerical analysis and guidance contained in
the fifth portion of the chapter.
In the expansive fifth section, we conduct an in-depth simulation covering a great
range of potential model parameters. Intuition is coupled with rigorous statistical
techniques to establish guidance for buyers, sellers, and third party coordinators.
4.1 The Role of a Third Party Coordinator
A large amount of money is wasted each year due to poor policy coordination. By
one estimate, these inefficiencies add up to a sizable $30B (Lee et al., 1997). Of course,
capturing all of this would be no easy task, but there is low hanging fruit up for grabs
since most organizations have done very little in way of collaboration (Fawcett and
Magnan, 2002). So, why hasn’t more been done to capture these potential savings?
The answer to this simple question is that there are many concerns preventing
or sabotaging cooperation efforts between buyers and suppliers. So, even though
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there is a desire for more collaboration, a general worry about close collaboration
with a possible future competitor or the supplier to a competitor can dampen the
desire for coordination (Fawcett and Magnan, 2002). A neutral third party can act
as a buffer between the buyer and supplier, acting as both a mental separator, and
if needed, physical liaison. This also applies to when either party desires a “buffer”
to lessen the possibility of a merger or acquisition due to close collaboration (Sabath
and Fontanella, 2002).
Among other “barriers and bridges” to partnership are two important subjects:
confidentiality and abuse of power (Kelle and Akbulut, 2005). To address the concern
over the sharing of confidential or proprietary information, the 3PC can sign and be
bound by a non-disclosure agreement (NDA). This can be done prior to or at the
time of formulating the supply chain contract. This, in effect, turns the 3PC into an
“information escrow”, collecting all of the required sensitive information from both
parties, responsible for analyzing and producing recommendations, but not sharing
the most sensitive of information of one party with the other party. Giving this
confidentiality barrier additional credence, Storey et al. (2006) found that a member of
a supply chain is likely to intentionally withhold important information from another
member to prevent the latter from being “tipped off” to sensitive information such
as promotional campaigns or product launches. To prevent the second barrier, abuse
of power, the 3PC is in a unique position to act as a referee and arbitrator. In this
position, the third party can push for resolutions and agreements that benefit the
entire supply chain, rather than just the dominating supply chain partner.
Another possible barrier to cooperation arises when one or both parties supply
false or misleading information to their “partner” in an effort to encourage and reap
the benefits of locally-optimal supply chain policies. If this sabotage is left unchecked,
it can cause disruptive and undesirable effects (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002;
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Sabath and Fontanella, 2002). A 3PC, provided open-access, can verify all given infor-
mation to help negate this concern. Additionally, a well-connected 3PC with real-time
data can assist in minimizing the bullwhip effect, which can increase profitability by
10% to 30% (Metters, 1997). There are a few 3PL and 4PL firms attempting to enter
this role of a neutral third party (Fulconis et al., 2006; Storey et al., 2006; Zacharia
et al., 2011), though none to date have responsibilities to the extent suggested here.
Disruption of collaboration efforts due to a change in personnel is a real threat.
Collaboration requires trust and is often based on a relationships formed by just a
few people, even in large corporations (Frankel et al., 2002). If one of these few
people depart his or her position, a collaboration effort could fail. A third party can
offer continuity between organizations during personnel changes. Further, a third
party can help establish common terminology and expectations, a surprising reason
for failure (Daugherty et al., 2006).
With the previously “soft” costs now quantified in the manner described in Chap-
ter 3, a logical extension of the role of a 3PC would be to act as an insurer and/or
expeditor in the case of a supply chain disruption or rare event. In this capacity,
the 3PC would still determine the jointly optimal decision variable values, but take
additional payments or commission to remove some of the risk costs from the joint
cost equation. This could also help ensure collaboration since some of the costs, such
as risk of a partner’s bankruptcy, might be better left out of the contract discussions
as these numbers would be a possible focus of scrutiny and contention.
Perhaps the most obvious and easily quantifiable benefit to a third party coordi-
nator is the elimination of the need for coordination mechanisms. These sometimes
complicated and often inefficient solutions to supply chain coordination, at best, ap-
proach the potential profit gains that are possible with a true jointly optimal policy.
They offer no improvements to less quantifiable subjects, such as trust and continu-
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ity. Trust is critical for the success of collaboration and is in short supply in modern
supply chains (Lee and Billington, 1992; Ireland and Bruce, 2000; Barratt, 2004; Min
et al., 2005; Daugherty et al., 2006). On further consideration, many of the barri-
ers to cooperation can be reduced to an issue of trust: trust that your partner will
keep sensitive information confidential, trust that your partner will provide you with
honest information, trust that both parties have similar expectations, and trust that
your relationship won’t be affected by a simple personnel change. A 3PC, if seen as
a neutral broker, can assist with all of these factors, increasing trust, and increasing
the probability of a successful collaboration. However, a supply chain with a third
party is not expected to be a utopian paradise. There remains numerous limitations
to what can be realistically accomplished with a 3PC, and knowing these limitations
could prove helpful.
4.2 Limits and Consequences of a Third Party Coordinator
The clearest impediment to the incorporation of a third party coordinator (3PC)
into the supply chain structure and making of policy decisions is the potential cost
of that third party expert. If a buyer and supplier were capable of ignoring all of the
previously mentioned trust issues, had stable personnel, and never needed arbitration
services, the two firms could jointly optimize the supply chain decisions to provide
maximum profits. However, we know that this rarely happens in practice. So, if the
buyer and supplier use the services of a 3PC, remuneration would be expected. This
payment would, of course, cut into the increased profits of the supply chain. The only
way this is justifiable is if the increase in profits is greater than both the remuneration
required for the services of the third party coordinator and the increase in profits
expected by both the buyer and supplier. After all, coordination efforts always have
a cost, quantified or not (Zhao and Wang, 2002). Further, if “arms-length” contracts
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are sufficient, particularly for non-unique or commodity items, collaboration may not
be beneficial enough to justify the effort (Lambert and Burduroglu, 2000; Horvath,
2001).
One more possible complication in considering the use of a 3PC comes from es-
timating the potential profit gains that are possible with a coordination effort. It
could be quite difficult to know a priori if there are significant enough gains avail-
able to justify the inclusion of a third party. This concern is tempered with the
knowledge that such a situation should be quite noticeable in practice. We would
expect large discrepancies in the desired policy variables of the buyer and supplier.
For example, if the buyer demands 200 deliveries of 100 units each while the supplier
would strongly prefer 2 delivers of 10,000 each, we would have a strong indication
that the addition of a third party could be beneficial. Sure enough, this concept
is borne out by the numerical analysis shown in Section 4.5. Another method for
predicting possible savings is through a simple “ABC” style analysis. Efforts can be
concentrated on high-value “A” items while low-value “C” items are left to simple
devices such as arms-length contracts or vendor managed inventory (VMI) systems.
After experience with successful coordination efforts, we would expect firms to move
on to “B” items. One possible exception to this methodology might occur in situa-
tions where a buyer purchases multiple products from a supplier. In those cases, we
could expect broader agreements on collaboration with separate or perhaps modular
contracting for each additional purchased item, to gain benefits that come from both
collaboration and jointly optimal policy decisions. These multiple product scenarios
are, however, beyond the scope of this research.
There are other limits to the value that a 3PC may add. After the initial systems
and policy decisions are made, we would expect the daily logistics to be handled
as close to shipping and receiving as possible. To prevent becoming an obstacle to
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communication or smooth operation, we should only desire intervention by a third
party for the exceptions, not routine business. Fortunately, those items likely to gain
the most from close coordination, “A” and some “B” items, are also the ones that
should already be receiving the closest inter-organizational focus. The consequence
of this is that after the communication systems are set in place (or improved) with
the aid of the 3PC, we are less likely to need the services of that 3PC for common
sources of potential disruption, such as design or specification changes or quality
issues. These issues can more likely be addressed at the lowest levels before becoming
a larger problem.
4.3 Quantitative Support and Updated Model
In this section, we update a recent JELS model (Kelle et al., 2007; Masten and
Kim, 2015) which in turn was based on work by Kim and Ha (2003), Banerjee and
Kim (1995), as well as others. This updated model includes a third party coordinator
(3PC) along with the more inclusive cost models introduced in Chapter 3. This new
model will be the basis for all further analysis and study in the current research unless
otherwise noted. To help quickly reference the foundations of this updated model,
the following summary list is presented2:
1. Model is for a dyadic relationship between one (1) buyer and one (1) supplier
for one (1) item.
2. Without intervention, either the buyer or the supplier will be in a significantly
stronger negotiating position.
3. The decision variables of the model are number of shipments in a batch (m),
the number of shipments in a contract (n), and the shipment size (q).
2Note that these are in addition to or reiteration of the common assumptions listed in Section
1.4.3.
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4. Total contracted quantity is not fixed and equal to nq.
5. Overall contract duration is not fixed and is equal to nq
D
.
6. Goal is to minimize the average total relevant cost per time unit (TRC), a
function of the decision variables: m, n, and q.
7. Choice of n andm is always subject to n/m ∈ Z+ regardless of which firm chooses
n.
8. Metric of coordination success is the percent reduction in per time-unit supply
chain costs (i.e. 1− TRCJoint
TRCSB
or 1− TRCJoint
TRCSS
).
While most of the above are self-explanatory, a few items can benefit from further
exposition. Item 2 reminds us that, without some outside help, the stronger party
will use its negotiating strength to locally minimize costs. Of course, in practice, we
would rarely expect a party in a stronger negotiating position to be able to com-
pletely dictate all contract terms. We will continue to use the “worst case” of an
unquestionably strong party as a consistent point of reference. In item 7, we reiterate
that no uncommitted parts will be produced. However, the enforcement of this con-
straint changes depending on the scenario. The stronger party moves first and only
considers the constraint if they have to. For example, a strong buyer will disregard
this constraint and freely choose n, leaving the supplier with limited options for m
in which to comply with the constraint. The metric to measure the supply chain im-
provement due to the transition from non-cooperative (SB, SS) to cooperative (Joint)
is described in item 8. This number, presented as a percentage, reflects the reduction
in average total relevant cost per time-unit for the referenced scenario. We now turn
our attention to the process and effects of third party remuneration.
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4.3.1 Payment to the Third Party Coordinator
From Chapter 3, the average total cost per time unit to the buyer if no 3PC is
used is
TCB(n, q) =
[
hB
q
2 + ZB
D
q
]
+
[
AB
D
nq
]
+
∑
i
LBiVBi(n, q). (4.1)
Similarly, the supplier’s total relevant cost per time-unit is
TCS(m,n, q) =
hS
mq
2
[
1− D
P
− 1
m
+ 2D
mP
]
+ ZS
D
q
+ AS
D
mq
+
OTCS
D
nq
+
∑
i
LSiVSi(m,n, q), (4.2)
which includes OTCS Dnq , the amortized one-time contract costs for the supplier.
Therefore, the average joint total cost with payment to a 3PC is
TCJ(m,n, q) = TCB(n, q) + TCS(m,n, q) + TC3PC(m,n, q). (4.3)
Expanding this and adding three possible payment methods to the 3PC, yields
TCJ(m,n, q) = [
hB
q
2 + ZB
D
q
]
+
[
AB
D
nq
]
+
∑
i
LBiVBi(n, q)+
OTCS
D
nq
+ hS
mq
2
[
1− D
P
− 1
m
+ 2D
mP
]
+ ZS
D
q
+ AS
D
mq
+
∑
i
LSiVSi(m,n, q)+[
A3PC
D
nq
]
+
[
Â3PC
]
+ Z3PC
D
q
, (4.4)
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where A3PC is a per-contract charge by the third party for services rendered for
the coming contract. We observe that A3PC has the same form as AB or OTCS,
letting us conclude that, for our jointly optimal policy decisions, increasing A3PC is
indistinguishable from increasing either AB or OTCS. As an alternative or in addition
to the per-contract charge, the 3PC may charge Â3PC , a periodic payment for services.
As an example of this charge, we can picture a third party coordinator charging an
annual fee for its services. The last term in the above equation, Z3PC , is a per-delivery
charge. This might be an intuitive charge for a “3PL+” acting as a 3PC since the
fee would be charged as a surcharge on top of the normal delivery charge. From the
perspective of a jointly optimal policy, this is analogous to increasing ZB or ZS. The
minimization of this joint cost problem can be readily solved for n, m, and q using
various open-source (e.g. BONMIN) or proprietary (e.g. BARON) solvers. This
is a mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) problem. Assuming reasonable
bounds are provided to the solver, computing time is typically negligible.
It is imperative to note that the non-periodic fees for the 3PC, A3PC and Z3PC ,
are both decreasing in q with A3PC also decreasing in n. This presents a conflict of
interest for the third party coordinator assuming these fees are set ahead of time.
Hypothetically, offered a fixed per-delivery fee of Z3PC , the 3PC could report a lower
than jointly optimal q to increase the frequency of deliveries, thus increasing its own
income at the expense of buyer and supplier. Similarly, presented with a fixed A3PC ,
reporting a lower and sub-optimal n would have the effect of shortening the contract
period. With the assumption of continued business, the 3PC could charge this fee
more often, increasing revenue. Even without the assumption of continued business,
lowering n decreases the time and/or effort required. This might go unnoticed if the
buyer and supplier still improve their outcomes over the non-cooperative policy. A
periodic fee, Â3PC , would prevent this conflict of interest. Further, if this fee is paid as
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commission on savings, it would only provide additional incentive to aid cooperation.
This idea is explored more in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.1.1 MINLP for a Strong Buyer Scenario
The strong buyer solves the following MINLP:
min
n,q
TCB(n, q)
subject to n ∈ Z+
q ∈ R+
.
The supplier responds by solving:
min
m
TCS(m,nB, qB)
subject to m ∈ Z+
nB/m ∈ Z+
.
4.3.1.2 MINLP for a Strong Supplier Scenario
The strong supplier solves the following MINLP:
min
m,n,q
TCS(m,n, q)
subject to n ∈ Z+
q ∈ R+
m ∈ Z+
n/m ∈ Z+
.
The buyer has no decisions to make unless the supplier has no commitment cost
(LSi = 0 ∀i), in which case the strong supplier solves:
min
m,q
TCS(m, q)
subject to q ∈ R+
m ∈ Z+
.
This leaves the buyer with a choice of contract length by choosing from limited
values of n:
min
n
TCB(n, qS)
subject to n ∈ Z+
n/mS ∈ Z+
.
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4.3.1.3 MINLP for a Third Party Scenario
The third party solves the following MINLP:
min
m,n,q
TCJ(m,n, q)
subject to n ∈ Z+
q ∈ R+
m ∈ Z+
n/m ∈ Z+
.
4.3.2 Payment to Third Party as a Proportion of Profit Gained
Rather than a per-contract or per-shipment payment, which may not be acceptable
to the buyer and supplier due to the potential conflict of interest discussed above, it
may be preferable to compensate the third party based on the improvement they offer
to the bottom line (i.e. a commission). The weak supplier (or buyer), having the most
to gain by moving to a jointly optimal solution, is the party that would likely seek
out the assistance of a third party coordinator. The 3PC would first estimate based
on any available information whether it is worthwhile to coordinate the supply chain
based on some minimum profit criteria (explored further in the numerical analysis).
After compensating the strong buyer (or supplier), the 3PC takes a certain percentage
of the gain and splits the remainder between the buyer and supplier.
It is important to note the individual non-cooperative models since any joint
agreement must provide an improvement to ensure cooperation from the members.
Since there is always a cost to collaboration using a third party, which adds to the
joint total cost without affecting profit, a collaboration attempt with a 3PC will
never perform as well in a cost minimization problem as a joint effort that does not
require a third party. However, based on the currently observed low success rate
of collaboration, there are significant savings available in cases where a third party
makes the difference between a successful collaboration and one that resorts to a
classical competitive arrangement.
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In consideration of the conflict of interest detailed above, buyers and suppliers
would undoubtedly prefer an incentive for the 3PC that is aligned with the success
of the cooperation rather than one that incentivizes sabotage. A payment scheme
based on the supply chain’s total cost reduction is one way to accomplish this. In
practice, we would expect the weaker party to seek out the services of a third party.
Intuitively, the weaker party might view a change of policy as a savings as opposed
to the strong party which could see any change in policy decisions as a cost increase.
This would prove especially true if the stronger party, not knowing the extent to
which the dictated terms cost the weaker party, discounts the potential side payment.
We would expect the contacted 3PC to first make a broad estimate based on all
available data, particularly the preferred m, n, and q of both the buyer and supplier.
Should the 3PC estimate adequate potential savings to compensate itself, the buyer,
and the supplier, it would agree to offer its services. After an initial side payment
to compensate the stronger party for its increased costs at the jointly optimal policy,
the third party would take a percentage of the supply chain gains and split remaining
improvement between the buyer and supplier. An example of this process is laid out
in Section 1.6.
Since any profit-seeking firm, such as a 3PC, invariably demands payment for
its efforts, no collaboration that requires the use of a third party can outperform
a collaboration that does not require the assistance of an outside player. However,
considering the poor rates of collaboration success, significant savings are available
where a 3PC becomes the catalyst for a successful collaboration over a supply chain
that falls back to a suboptimal competitive policy.
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4.4 A Numerical Example
The goal of this numerical example is to open the door to the more rigorous nu-
merical analysis presented in Section 4.5. In this section, we shall consider some
important relationships among the buyer’s and supplier’s parameters and their rela-
tive effects on contract size, individual costs, joint costs, and potential savings. This
will be accomplished by finding the optimal policies in each of the three scenarios
of interest (Strong Buyer, Strong Supplier, Third Party Coordinator) over 11 evenly
spaced points (10 segments) in the sensitivity ranges described in Table 4.2. These
sensitivity figures are produced by holding the denominator constant and varying the
numerator of each relationship of interest. Note than an important effect caused by
this methodology is a straight line for one the parties (typically the strong supplier).
Therefore, in all of the following graphs, it is more important to notice the relative
distances and trends between lines rather than the absolute figures or trends. Finally,
note that in this section we will prefer the term “Joint” over “Third Party Coordi-
nator” or “3PC” to remove possible confusion over remuneration and to emphasize
that these differences are inherent to the nature of each scenario and not due to the
responsibilities or actions of a particular party. The third party’s perspective will be
analyzed as part of Section 4.5. To avoid confusion, scenarios will be capitalized (e.g.
“Strong Supplier” or “SS” ) while individual firms will be referred to in lower case
(e.g. “a strong supplier”).
The total relevant cost equations used in this numerical example are:
TCB(n, q) =
[
hB
q
2 + ZB
D
q
]
+
[
AB
D
nq
]
+ LBCB
nq
2 (4.5)
for the buyer, and
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Table 4.1: Numerical Example Default Parameters
Parameter Default Value Unit
P 40000 items/year capacity
D 20000 items/year demand
ZB 2500 $/delivery received
AB 5000 $/contract
CB 100 $/item
rB 0.15 holding cost rate
LB 0.08 commitment cost rate
ZS 2500 $/delivery shipped
AS 10000 $/batch
CS 40 $/item
rS 0.15 holding cost rate
OTCS 50000 $/contract
LS 0.08 commitment cost rate
hB = rB ∗ CB
hS = rS ∗ CS
TCS(m,n, q) = hS
mq
2
[
1− D
P
− 1
m
+ 2D
mP
]
+ZS
D
q
+AS
D
mq
+LSCS
nq
2 +OTCS
D
nq
(4.6)
for the supplier. These equations have the commitment costs in the same format for
both the buyer and supplier, expressed as a cost on parts yet-to-be-delivered. One-
time costs are included for the supplier. The default parameter values are listed in
Table 4.1.
Table 4.3 summarizes the optimal policies for the three scenarios of interest using
the default parameters listed in Table 4.1. This provides us with a baseline of com-
parison for the forthcoming sensitivity analyses. From this summary, we note that
the 3PC policy does indeed offer the lowest total cost, as expected. We can also see
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Table 4.2: Numerical Example Sensitivity Ranges for Relationships of Interest
Relationship of Interest Constant Value(s) Sensitivity Range
LB/LS LS = 0.08 0.1− 1.5
rB/rS rS = 0.08 0.1− 1.5
ZB/ZS ZS = 2500 0.1− 1.5
AS/(ZS+ZB) ZS = 2500, ZB = 2500 1− 10
CB/CS CS = 40 1− 10
AB/OTCS OTCS = 50000 0.1− 1.5
P/D D = 20000 1− 10
Table 4.3: Optimal Decision Variables and Related Results with Default Parameters
Optimal SB SS 3PC
q 2540 12,632 3441
n 2 2 4
m 2 1 4
nq (Contract Size) 5080 25,264 13,764
mq (Batch Size) 5080 12,632 13,764
Contract Length (Years) 0.25 1.26 0.69
TC ($) 350,394 322,456 247,043
% Coordination Savings 29.5% 23.4% -
that the buyer prefers both smaller contracts and smaller deliveries than the supplier.
This base case provides us with an interesting example demonstrating that the jointly
optimal n, m, and mq values do not need to be bounded by the SB and SS policy
decisions.
4.4.1 Sensitivity to LB/LS
We expect an increase in the commitment cost rates LB and LS to shorten the
buyer’s and supplier’s respective desired contract size, nq. As expected, this is con-
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Figure 4.1: Sensitivity of Contract Size (nq) to LB/LS
firmed in our results for the Strong Buyer (SB) case, but also holds for a Strong
Supplier (SS) case where LS increases (not shown). Recall that since LS is constant
in the ratio, the presented optimal policy for SS is not affected, though the relative
distances keep interpretability. We can see the contract size for SB quickly decreas-
ing from about 15,000 to 5,000. With a time-unit of one year and a demand rate
of 20,000, this represents a decrease of contract length from nine months to three
months. This considerable drop results from the buyer’s optimal n (nB) quickly
dropping from six (6) to two (2) with qB remaining relatively unchanged, presumably
due to the other parameters. Meanwhile, the jointly optimal (Joint) policy for nq
(nJqJ) decreases more slowly than for SB due to n decreasing more slowly. We see
that when LB  LS (on left side of graph), the Joint policy is close to the SS policy.
As LB increases past LS, we see nJqJ begin to approach the optimal policy for SB.
In Figure 4.2, the joint total relevant costs (JTRC) for each of the three scenarios are
presented. Surprisingly, the total cost curves for SB and SS appear strikingly similar,
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Figure 4.2: Sensitivity of Joint Total Relevant Cost (JRTC) to LB/LS
with the lines crossing at about 0.5 but otherwise close. The potential savings by
moving from SB to Joint (shown in dotted green) increases rapidly before tapering
off. This mirrors the quick drop for SB seen in Figure 4.1. The savings are minimal
with the a low LB since the SB policy there most resembles the Joint policy. Figure
4.3 lets us visualize the relative costs of all four possible individual firms and helps
explain the apparent discrepancies in the JTRC figure. Again, note that with LS
constant, a strong supplier does not show a cost increase. For both SB and SS, the
stronger party updates its optimal policy to minimize its own costs, resulting in huge
cost increases for the supply chain at large as the dictated parameters increasingly
deviate from the weaker party’s optimal numbers.
4.4.2 Sensitivity to rB/rS
We turn our attention to the holding cost rates, rB and rS. We do not expect
any sizable effect on the contract commitment based on the cost rate for on-hand
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Figure 4.3: Sensitivity of Individual Total Relevant Cost (TRC) to LB/LS
inventory, and this is confirmed in our results (see Figure 4.4). As before, the nq
from the Joint policy is roughly halfway between the SS and SB policies. Intuitively,
we expect the buyer to desire more frequent, but smaller, deliveries as rB increases
in order to minimize the holding cost. The supplier has a similar response to a
rising rS, and becomes increasingly willing to pay for additional setups to keep on-
hand inventory costs at bay (not shown). In Figures 4.5 and 4.6, we can see the
savings potential dip as rB approaches rS. This sudden decrease in costs for the weak
supplier is due to the buyer demanding two deliveries of about 2850 units each instead
of one delivery of 5000 units. This allows the supplier to split a single batch across
two deliveries, creating significant savings despite the slightly increased delivery and
holding costs.
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Figure 4.4: Sensitivity of Contract Size (nq) to rB/rS
Figure 4.5: Sensitivity of Joint Total Relevant Cost (JRTC) to rB/rS
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Figure 4.6: Sensitivity of Individual Total Relevant Cost (TRC) to rB/rS
4.4.3 Sensitivity to ZB/ZS
We do not expect large changes to the contract size due to ZB/ZS. This is confirmed
in our findings. As ZB increases, the buyer prefers fewer, but larger, deliveries.
This naturally aligns the buyer more closely with the supplier, slightly decreasing
our potential savings and saving a weak supplier up to $50,000 in costs per year.
However, even at extreme values of ZB, the desired policies do not merge as the
buyer will request ever larger q at n = 1 while the supplier’s minimal cost is at n = 2.
We can conclude that our contract sizes, costs, and possible savings are fairly
robust to changes in ZB/ZS.
4.4.4 Sensitivity to AS/(ZS+ZB)
The ratio AS/(ZS+ZB) represents the supplier’s batch cost in relation to the com-
bined delivery costs of both buyer and supplier. We expect large values of AS to
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Figure 4.7: Sensitivity of Contract Size (nq) to ZB/ZS
Figure 4.8: Sensitivity of Joint Total Relevant Cost (JRTC) to ZB/ZS
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Figure 4.9: Sensitivity of Individual Total Relevant Cost (TRC) to ZB/ZS
increase the supplier’s preferred m and q since either would entail fewer batch set-
ups. In a Strong Buyer scenario, the weak supplier will only have control of m.
However, with our chosen parameters, even at the lowest value of AS, where a set-up
only costs the same as both deliveries, the weak supplier will still choose its highest
possible m, which is m = nB. Fortunately, from the Joint case, we can still see this
increase in m, which increases from m = 2 at the lowest presented ratio to m = 5 at
the highest shown sensitivity ratio.
Perhaps surprisingly, we see some considerable fluctuation in the SS value for nq
(see Figure 4.10). This variance is due to an increase in q and decrease in n with the
resulting nq being the best available (lowest cost) compromise. The optimal Joint
contract starts halfway between SS and SB, but moves slowly towards the SS contract
size as AS increases. Interestingly, the Joint policy utilizes n = 4 or n = 5 for all
results even though neither the strong buyer nor strong supplier at any studied ratio
desire more than n = 3.
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Figure 4.10: Sensitivity of Contract Size (nq) to AS/(ZS+ZB)
From the joint and individual total relevant costs (Figures 4.11 and 4.12), we see
that even a strong supplier can not correct for an increasing batch cost, though a
weak supplier will pay much more in comparison. In an SS scenario, q quickly rises,
causing a rapid increase in holding costs for a weak buyer.
We conclude that quickly escalating costs to a weak supplier may create significant
differences in relative costs and thus potential savings as the batch cost increases. The
discrepancy in each party’s preferred q at a high ratio (qB = 2540 vs. qS = 25716
at a sensitivity ratio of 10) demonstrates a situation that should trigger alarms in a
practitioner’s head and signal the possible need for outside assistance.
4.4.5 Sensitivity to CB/CS
At first, it might be easy to dismiss item cost as an exogenous number since the
price paid directly for the items is not considered a relevant cost in our equations.
However, the item cost is considered twice in our costs, once in the commitment costs,
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Figure 4.11: Sensitivity of Joint Total Relevant Cost (JRTC) to AS/(ZS+ZB)
Figure 4.12: Sensitivity of Individual Total Relevant Cost (TRC) to AS/(ZS+ZB)
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Figure 4.13: Sensitivity of Contract Size (nq) to CB/CS
but also somewhat hidden in the holding costs. We recall the formulations for the
commitment costs and holding costs are LiCi nq2 and hi = riCi, respectively. Since C
is directly proportional to both our commitment and holding costs, we should expect
a large effect from changes in CB/CS and we are not disappointed. In Figure 4.13, we
see the optimal Joint contract size rapidly decrease and move from being closer to SS
to being closer to SB. This occurs because both the buyer and joint optimal q drops
rapidly while n remains unchanged or even, counter-intuitively, increases.
In Figure 4.14, it is shown that the supply chain costs are fairly similar even
though all policies differ dramatically. We can see the power of joint optimization
in this example as the savings potential increases rapidly with an increasing CB/CS.
Having a weak buyer’s costs increase quickly is not surprising, but what is somewhat
surprising is the rapid increase in cost for a weak supplier (see Figure 4.15). This
is primarily caused by receiving extremely short contracts from a strong buyer due
to the sharp increase in commitment costs. These short contracts force very large
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Figure 4.14: Sensitivity of Joint Total Relevant Cost (JRTC) to CB/CS
contract (e.g. tooling) costs onto the supplier. However, due to the increased profit
margin that comes from a large CB/CS, the net profit for a weak supplier actually
increases despite the sharp increase in costs. The opposite is true for a weak buyer,
which only faces increasing costs.
4.4.6 Sensitivity to AB/OTCS
In stark contract to the previous ratios, as AB increases relative to OTCS, the
preferred contract quantities begin to converge. Both of these are one-time contract
costs such as tooling or legal fees. If AB  OTCS, then we see a buyer that is
relatively unconcerned about amortizing up-front costs, and thus chooses a smaller
n. As AB approaches OTCS, the buyer prefers a larger n with little change in q. In
this manner, it is the complement of LB, playing a similar, though opposite, role in
our calculation.
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Figure 4.15: Sensitivity of Individual Total Relevant Cost (TRC) to CB/CS
Figure 4.16: Sensitivity of Contract Size (nq) to AB/OTCS
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Figure 4.17: Sensitivity of Joint Total Relevant Cost (JRTC) to AB/OTCS
In Figure 4.17, we see that as AB approaches OTCS, we reach a very efficient
Strong Buyer case, with possible savings of only 5% at a 0.5 ratio, continuing down
to about 2% when AB = OTCS. Figure 4.18 shows relatively close-grouped and
somewhat parallel lines over most of the sensitivity range, informing us that neither
weak party is particularly susceptible to a stronger partner. On the contrary, we
observe a rare case where the weak supplier benefits quickly from the rising cost of
the strong buyer. This is opposite of what we saw with LB/LS.
4.4.7 Sensitivity to P/D
Our final sensitivity analysis is focused on the P/D ratio. As neither demand nor
capacity have a logical bearing on contract commitment, it is not surprising to find
relatively straight lines in Figure 4.19. The most important ratios to consider here
are 1 through 5, which represent demands of 100% of capacity to 20% of capacity,
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Figure 4.18: Sensitivity of Individual Total Relevant Cost (TRC) to AB/OTCS
respectively. At less than 20%, we can safely consider the buyer a “small player” for
the supplier.
The joint total relevant costs shown in Figure 4.20 show us that there is a switch
around 25% of capacity (P/D = 4) where the higher costs and savings potential change
from the SB case to the SS case. This change coincides with a strong supplier moving
to an n = 1 policy (to achieve a high q) to minimize batch and delivery costs at the
slight expense of increased holding costs.
4.4.8 Summary of Sensitivity Analyses
The presented sensitivity analyses allow us to better understand some of the fun-
damental relationships in the model and form some expectations for the numerical
analysis in Section 4.5. From the D/P analysis, we do not expect a heavy influence
on possible savings unless the D/P ratio is close to 1. This is mostly attributed to the
added expense of the supplier that must balance production capabilities with delivery
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Figure 4.19: Sensitivity of Contract Size (nq) to P/D
Figure 4.20: Sensitivity of Joint Total Relevant Cost (JRTC) to P/D
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Figure 4.21: Sensitivity of Individual Total Relevant Cost (TRC) to P/D
promises. This creates a need for increased use of batch splitting. From examining
the one-time costs, we can only predict issues if AB  OTCS and OTCS in a Strong
Buyer scenario. As the part costs diverge, we expect a very fast increase in potential
savings, particularly with a strong supplier. The per-delivery costs and capital costs
appear to have minimal effect on the possible savings. Finally, from evaluating the
relationship of commitment cost rates (LB/LS), we expect lower savings for a relatively
low LB or a relatively high LS.
4.5 Numerical Analysis and Guidance
This section will be divided into four (4) parts. The first part will describe the test
setup and methodology for the numerical example. The next portion will interpret
the results from the perspective of a strong buyer (SB). The third will interpret
the results from the perspective of a strong supplier (SS). The following section will
approach the problem from the perspective of a neutral third party. The fifth and
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final part will attempt to put all the findings together into a cohesive conclusion
to help provide insight and guidance. The most critical performance measurement
is savings as a percent of total relevant cost by jointly minimizing relevant supply
chain rather than individual minimization. This measure is independent of scale and
allows us to directly explore the relative impacts of factors without interpretation or
adjustment.
4.5.1 Test Setup and Methodology
To provide a meaningful numerical example, the scenario parameters were care-
fully selected to mimic a wide range of plausible scenarios. These are loosely based on
the values used by Kelle et al. (2007), but with some notable changes and additions.
Consider a supplier with a production capacity of 40,000 units per time-period.
Demand is unclear and may take almost any value up to the production capacity.
Buyers pay $2500 for a domestic delivery (ZB), but twice that for international de-
liveries. Similarly, contracting costs (AB) are $5000 for some buyers, but twice that
for others. These factors are independent of each other. The supplier has built a
reputation on an “everyday low price” of $100, regardless of order size, and refuses
to negotiate price. Holding cost rates are standard across the industry at 15%. The
supplier’s per-order (with contract and tooling costs), per-batch, and per-unit pro-
duction costs are constant at $50,000, $10,000, and $40, respectively. Both the buyer
and supplier determine commitment cost rates based on a long list of situational
factors. These rates range from 0.01 to 0.15. It is unknown which party, buyer or
supplier, will be in the stronger negotiating position.
To study this range of possible scenarios, 9900 sample scenarios were created. In
each iteration, the demand was increased by four (4), with the remaining parameters
determined by the probabilities described above and summarized in Table 4.4. To
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determine the optimal decision variables for each sample scenario’s parameters, the
BONMIN solver was deployed via AMPL programming. Optimal decision variables
were recorded for three (3) possibilities: an extremely strong buyer, an extremely
strong supplier, or perfect cooperation. Generating each set of solutions required
approximately 0.5 to 1 second of processing time on an Intel i5-2520M CPU, with
all 9900 samples requiring approximately 75 minutes of CPU time. Generous upper
bounds and constraints for decision variables were designated to prevent potential
solver issues. As expected, no results were found to be bounded by the solver feasi-
bility parameters or constraints. However, it should be noted that this is not guar-
anteed for all possible parameter choices, as we would expect infeasibility in the case
of LB = 0, as discussed at length in the previous chapter.
The main advantage of the above process is a near-complete3 and even represen-
tation of D/P ratios while we investigate other factors. This ensures that we can easily
and evenly segment the samples for analysis based on different ranges of D/P ratios.
The supplier numbers (save LS) are kept constant for a similar rationale.
In the first scenario (“Scenario 1”), we vary only LB and LS to investigate the
“pure” effects of each factor. In the second scenario, we add ZB andAB to the analysis,
reflecting the situation described at the beginning of the section. The commitment
costs in this numerical analysis will be in the same format for both the buyer and
supplier, expressed as a cost on parts yet-to-be-delivered. This yields relevant cost
formulas of:
TCB(n, q) =
[
hB
q
2 + ZB
D
q
]
+
[
AB
D
nq
]
+ LBCB
nq
2 (4.7)
for the buyer, and
3Extremely low values of D (<400) were avoided to preserve granularity and prevent other issues
as the D/P ratio approaches 0.
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Table 4.4: Scenario Parameters
Parameter Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Description “LB and LS Only” “Scenario 1 with ZB and AB”
P 40000 40000
D {400, 404, . . . 4k, . . . 39996} {400, 404, . . . 4k, . . . 39996}
ZB 2500 2500 + 2500 w.p. 0.5
AB 5000 5000 + 5000 w.p. 0.5
CB 100 100
rB .15 .15
LB Unif(0.01,0.15) Unif(0.01,0.15)
ZS 2500 2500
AS 10000 10000
CS 40 40
rS .15 .15
otcS 50000 50000
LS Unif(0.01,0.15) Unif(0.01,0.15)
hB = rB ∗ CB
hS = rS ∗ CS
TCS(m,n, q) = hS
mq
2
[
1− D
P
− 1
m
+ 2D
mP
]
+ZS
D
q
+AS
D
mq
+LSCS
nq
2 +OTCS
D
nq
(4.8)
for the supplier, with the joint total cost, TCJ(m,n, q), being the simple addition of
the two.
4.5.2 Perspective from a Strong Buyer (SB)
Using only a simple breakdown of potential savings by LB categories of Low_LB
(.01-.0249), Med_LB (.025-.049), and High_LB (.05-.15), it is clear that there is a
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Figure 4.22: Distribution of Supply Chain Savings Percentage by LB Category
relationship between savings4 and LB in Scenario 1. A cubic regression yields R2=
0.717 with a p-value = 0.000. This relationship is shown in Figure 4.23.
A closer inspection of this scatterplot shows a clearly stepped relationship between
supply chain savings and the LB rate. In fact, these steps occur at conspicuous LB
rates of 0.015, 0.025, and 0.05. These steps also coincide perfectly with a strong
buyer’s choice of n. This is demonstrated in figure 4.24. This “coincidence” might
not seem terribly surprising considering that the only factors varying to the buyer in
this analysis are demand and LB. However, as these are savings to the entire supply
chain, we must remember that we are clearly seeing these steps while the D/P ratio
and the LS rate, both allowed to vary widely, also play a role to the supplier’s costs.
4Note that all saving percentages presented in graphs and tables are in decimal format (e.g. 0.3
= 30%) regardless of categorical label.
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Figure 4.23: Cubic Regression Predicting Supply Chain Savings Using LB
Figure 4.24: Supply Chain Savings Grouped by a Strong Buyer’s Optimal Number
of Shipments (n)
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Figure 4.25: Supply Chain Savings Grouped by SB n and Paneled by AB and ZB
To better understand other factors and interplay between terms that could influ-
ence the supply chain savings, we will allow two of the buyer’s costs to fluctuate. In
Scenario 2, AB is allowed to take either of two values: 5000 or 10000 and ZB is also
allowed two values: 2500 or 5000. Each of the values has a 50% chance of being used
in each run, providing us four potential combinations. The analogous scatterplot to
Figure 4.24 is presented in Figure 4.25.
To help explain these results, we can investigate the formulas more closely. As-
suming relaxation of the integer constraint, we can calculate the optimal number of
deliveries for a strong buyer (SB):
n̂B =
√
ABhB
LBCBZB
=
√
AB
ZB
rB
LB
. (4.9)
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From this equation, we predict the LB cutoffs to be 0.01, 0.0148, 0.0245, 0.048,
and 0.133 to produce n̂B values of 5,4,3,2, and 1, respectively. These match closely to
the observed values of 0.015, 0.025, and 0.05 for n values of 4,3, and 2, respectively.
Contrary to the prediction, an n of 1 was not observed in the results after 0.133.
Note from the relaxed optimal solution that the value of n̂B will approach ∞ as
either LB or ZB approach 0. However, the intuition concerning these two parameters
is completely different. As LB approaches 0, there is no cost of commitment, therefore
the contracted quantity will increase without bound. Conversely, as ZB (the buyer’s
receiving cost) approaches 0, the buyer will request ever smaller delivery quantities
to minimize holding costs. Thus, qB will decrease (in practice limited to 1), requiring
ever larger n̂B to compensate and meet demand.
If only AB increases, the buyer faces a situation closer to the supplier with high
setup costs. This will give lower potential supply chain savings since both parties
will want similar terms. This can be seen in Figure 4.25 by comparing the upper-
left and lower-right corners, both with the same AB/ZB ratio, but the latter with a
higher AB. Here, the nB is the same for a given LB, but the potential savings are cut
approximately in half from 26.8% to 13.9%.
If only ZB increases, the buyer will want more units per delivery due to the
receiving cost becoming increasingly important over the relatively decreasing holding
cost, leaving fewer deliveries (n) required for a given contract length.
From Equation 4.9 above, we would expect an analogous interpretation based
on the rB/LB ratio. The intuition in this case is rather interesting, since rB is the
holding cost rate of parts-on-hand while LB is the opportunity cost of parts yet-to-
be-delivered. This forces us to balance more deliveries, reducing our need to pay for
parts in storage with the commitment cost on parts in future deliveries. In other
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Figure 4.26: Potential Supply Chain Savings against the Supplier’s Cost of Commit-
ment (LS) by SB Choice of n
words, a higher rB encourages smaller deliveries, while a higher LB encourages lesser
commitment.
As mentioned above, the total supply chain savings are also contingent upon
the supplier’s parameters. However, since the supplier’s costs, including its cost
of commitment has no bearing on a strong buyer’s optimal decision variables, the
changes in the supplier’s parameters can be interpreted as a variance in the potential
savings graphs above. This motivates us to explore the effect of an important cost
component of the supplier, LS.
In Figure 4.26, we again see, perhaps not surprisingly, the influence of the strong
buyer’s choice of n. We also see that the potential supply chain savings clearly decline
as the supplier’s cost of commitment LS increases. The intuition here is that for a
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Figure 4.27: Potential Savings against LB/LS with Log Scale for Scenario 1
given n, as LS increases, the supplier will have goals better aligned with the strong
buyer, creating less opportunity for savings.
In Figure 4.27, a fairly linear relationship between potential savings and log (LB/LS)
is seen. A quadratic regression yields a high R2 = 0.86 with a p-value = 0.000. This
increases to a very high R2 = 0.94 when combined with knowledge of nB. For ease of
interpretation, the x-axis rather than the ratio is presented in log scale. Additionally,
we observe some clustering based on the strong buyer’s choice of n, with n = 2
being particularly distinct. Putting these insights together, we can conclude that a
supplier faced with a strong buyer will have a major incentive to accurately predict
the buyer’s relative commitment costs. Since LS and nB are already known, even a
ballpark estimate of LB should provide a large indicator of potential savings. This
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Figure 4.28: Potential Savings against LB/LS with Log Scale for Scenario 2
holds true, though to a lower extent, in Scenario 2, where AB and ZB are each allowed
to double in value. The analogous graph for this scenario is shown in Figure 4.28,
where R2 has fallen from 0.94 to 0.71 due to the introduction of the varying AB and
ZB.
4.5.2.1 Supplier’s Response to Strong Buyer
Since m is the only decision for a supplier faced with a strong buyer, it is beneficial
to explore the effects of the buyer’s choice of n. In Tables 4.5 and 4.6, the cross
tabulations of m and n decisions are shown for both scenarios. In the first scenario,
we only observe that n = m,
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Table 4.5: Supplier’s Choice of m against Buyer’s Choice of n for Scenario 1
m ↓ /n→ 2 3 4 5 Total
2 7061 0 0 0 7061
3 0 1724 0 0 1724
4 0 0 751 0 751
5 0 0 0 364 364
Total 7061 1724 751 364 9900
Table 4.6: Supplier’s Choice of m against Buyer’s Choice of n for Scenario 2
m ↓ /n→ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
1 1372 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1373
2 0 5251 0 74 0 0 0 0 5325
3 0 0 1998 0 0 53 0 0 2051
4 0 0 0 646 0 0 0 7 653
5 0 0 0 0 368 0 0 0 368
6 0 0 0 0 0 61 0 0 61
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 0 63
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6
Total 1372 5251 1998 720 369 114 63 13 9900
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With a strong buyer, the supplier is only left with deciding on an optimal number
of shipments per batch, mS. Therefore, given nB and qB by the strong buyer, we can
calculate the relaxed optimal m̂S for the supplier as follows:
m̂S(qB) =
1
qB
√
2ASD
hS(1− D/P) . (4.10)
The optimal mS can be found with the following algorithm:
1. If m̂S ≥ nB, then mS = nB
2. If m̂S ≤ 1, then mS = 1
3. Otherwise, compute upper and lower candidates for mS
(a) Upper candidate mU found by increasing m̂S until nBm̂S ∈ Z
+
(b) Lower candidate mL found by decreasing m̂S until nBm̂S ∈ Z
+
4. Choose mS ∈ (mU ,mL) based on min
(
TCS|SB(mU), TCS|SB(mL)
)
Applying this algorithm to our data, we see the results summarized in Table 4.7.
Note that the m values used in the analysis were actually found using the BONMIN
solver and not from the above algorithm. However, comparing the solver optimized
values against the algorithm results, we find a 100% prediction accuracy, as expected.
If we further breakdown the results from the algorithm (see Table 4.8), we see
that usually, but not always, the optimal m will be the candidate closer to m̂S . This
is due to the nature of the cost function curves and the reason we must test both
candidates.
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Table 4.7: Summary of Algorithm Applied to Results from Scenarios 1 and 2
Case Scenario 1 Scenario 2
m̂S > nB 9401 8907
m̂S Increased and mU Used 499 861
m̂S Decreased and mL Used 0 132
Total 9900 9900
% Matching Algorithm 100% 100%
Table 4.8: Breakdown of Algorithm Usage Applied to Results from Scenarios 1 and 2
Case Distance Scenario 1 Scenario 2
mS = mU with mU − m̂S < m̂S −mL Closer 499 778
mS = mU with mU − m̂S > m̂S −mL Farther 0 83
mS = mL with m̂S −mL < mU − m̂S Closer 0 132
mS = mL with m̂S −mL > mU − m̂S Farther 0 0
Total 499 861
4.5.3 Perspective from a Strong Supplier (SS)
As discussed in previous sections, a strong supplier observing a cost of commitment
(LS) will dictate all decision variables in a contract. The buyer’s response comes
down to a simple “take it or leave it” decision. This leads to potentially gigantic cost
savings opportunities in the supply chain due to the large inefficiencies introduced.
In this section, we will examine the nature and interactions of the parameters onto
the potential supply chain savings. We will predominately focus on the results from
Scenario 1 as the differences in cost will have no effect on a strong supplier’s decisions.
Only significant differences between scenarios will be noted.
In Figure 4.29, savings as high as 60% are possible with a low LS value. In
these same graphs, similar to the strong buyer’s case, we observe some interesting
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Figure 4.29: Potential Supply Chain Savings against the Supplier’s Cost of Commit-
ment (LS), Grouped by SS Choice of n
relationships based on the strong supplier’s choice of n, along with breaks and gaps
within some choices of n, but not others. To better understand the causes behind
these gaps, each of these four panels will also be divided by the D/P ratio. These can
be seen in Figure 4.30. Note that each of the four panels in Figure 4.29 have now
been further broken down by the D/P ratios. Quadrants moving from upper left (Q1)
to lower right (Q4) have D/P ratios of 0.01 to <0.25, 0.25 to <.5, .5 to <.75, and .75
to ~1.00, respectively.
A few things become apparent from these graphs. First, we can better understand
the cause of some of the disjointed clusters of n decisions stems as rooted in LS and
the D/P ratio. For example, in the lower left quadrant labeled “SS_n_panel = n=5
or 6”, the previously disconnected clusters of n=5 now has the two groups of data
points split between categories of D/P ratio. This is repeated, to varying effectiveness,
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Figure 4.30: Potential Supply Chain Savings against LS, Grouped by SS Choice of
n, Paneled by D/P ratio
for other choices of n. Considering only the case of n=2, we can see that as either the
D/P or LS increase, the savings diminish. The is mirrored by other choices of n, which
in general informs us that we can expect lower potential savings when LS and D/P are
both high and higher potential savings when LS and D/P are both low, regardless of
n. Similarly, we see the influence of the D/P ratio on n by noting that if D/P < 0.25,
we have n ∈ (1, 2, 3) and if D/P > 0.75, we have n ∈ (4, 5, 6, . . .), regardless of LS.
The above conclusions are supported by both parametric or nonparametric tests. The
interactions between D/P , LS, and the supplier’s choice of n are shown in Figures 4.31,
4.32, and 4.33. Note that there are no surprising interactions between these three
factors. However, in Figure 4.31, we see D/P ratios in the third quartile displaying
some surprisingly erratic behavior. Also, in Figure 4.33, we can see some interesting
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Figure 4.31: Interaction between D/P Ratio and the Supplier’s Choice of n in Scenario
1
curves showing dips in the middle. This shape is due to the large savings at both
high and low n values, as can be seen in the earlier discussed Figure 4.30.
Further, we can confirm that a choice of n=1 is only made for D/P ratios of less
than 0.5. This can also be seen if we look at just n vs m as in Figure 4.34. In this
figure, we can observe that if the D/P ratio is less than 0.5, a SS will always choose
m=1, as expected and shown by Kelle et al. (2007). Note that this holds even with
the introduction of LS and OTCS. However, we also see that this is no guarantee
that n=1 or n=m. This suggests that even though it is advantageous to produce all
parts at once (i.e. m=1) when the D/P ratio is less than 0.5, it is better to commit to
a longer contract in some cases.
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Figure 4.32: Interaction between LS and the D/P Ratio in Scenario 1
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Figure 4.33: Interaction between LS and Supplier’s Choice of n
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Figure 4.34: SS Choice of n vs m, by D/P Ratio in Scenario 1 or 2
4.5.3.1 Buyer’s Response to Strong Supplier
For a strong supplier with LSi 6= 0 for some i and/or OTCS 6= 0, all decision
variables (m,n,q) will be decided by the strong supplier. The buyer will only have a
“take it or leave it” decision for the proposed contract.
A strong supplier with ∀i : LSi = 0 and OTCS = 0, will not have a preference for
n, the number of deliveries per contract, and would rationally leave the decision to the
buyer. Recall that for reasons emphatically stated in previous sections, this scenario
is rather unrealistic. Rather, we will consider suppliers with an effective ∀i : LSi = 0
and OTCS = 0 due to factors such as marketing, industry norms, or regulation. This
is explored in-depth below in Section 4.6.
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4.5.4 The Perspective from a Third Party Coordinator (3PC)
Until this point, we have only considered an unquestionably powerful strong buyer
or supplier, followed by the weaker party’s response. In this section, our goal is to
investigate the ability of a third party to predict the potential savings of a supply
chain provided limited information. The only information available to the 3PC are
the terms known to all parties at the time of the negotiation. These terms are
the supplier’s preferred n and q (nS, qS), the buyer’s preferred n and q (nB, qB),
the demand (D), and the wholesale price, CB. Of course, the preferred contract
commitments (nq) for the buyer and supplier are also known by inference. There are
two reasons to consider only the 3PC’s ability to predict possible savings. First, from
a practical viewpoint, a commission-based third party coordinator has an incentive
to accurately predict the potential savings from cooperation and jointly optimized
policies. Second, it provides us with a lower bound of either the buyer’s or supplier’s
ability to predict the potential savings, an important aspect since we expect one of
the parties (likely the weaker party) to recognize situations where there is the most
to gain by bringing in outside assistance in coordination.
To conduct this analysis, a simulation experiment is performed in a manner analo-
gous to Scenario 1 and 2. To prevent scaling issues, maintain consistent profit margins,
and to ease interpretation, P, CB, and CS are kept constant throughout the simulation
while the 10 other parameters are allowed to vary widely. In a fashion similar to the
previous section, we systematically simulate sets of parameters throughout virtually
all possible D/P combinations. The parameter ranges used are summarized in Table
4.9. We will use what was learned in the numerical example to aid in interpretation
of these results.
We begin by taking a look at the overall summary of the results. Recall that our
principal metric is savings as a percent of supply chain cost. The histograms showing
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Table 4.9: Scenario Parameters for 3PC Perspective
Parameter Scenario 3
Description “Many Unknowns”
P 40000
D {400, 404, . . . 4k, . . . 39996}
ZB Unif(0,5000)
AB Unif(0,10000)
CB 100
rB Unif(0.05,0.25)
LB Unif(0.01,0.15)
ZS Unif(0,5000)
AS Unif(0,20000)
CS 40
rS Unif(0.05,0.25)
otcS Unif(0,100000)
LS Unif(0.01,0.15)
hB = rB ∗ CB
hS = rS ∗ CS
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Figure 4.35: Histogram of Supply Chain Savings from Moving a Strong Buyer to a
Jointly Optimal Policy
Table 4.10: Summary Statistics for Scenario 3
Dominant Mean Std. Dev. Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max. Skew
Buyer 32.3% 18.3% 0% 18.0% 31.0% 45.1% 97.4% 0.37
Supplier 24.5% 14.5% 0% 13.2% 22.4% 34.4% 91.2% 0.57
the savings achieved for moving a strong buyer or strong supplier to jointly optimal
policies are shown in Figures 4.35 and 4.36, respectively. The summary statistics are
shown in Table 4.10.
From the histograms and summary statistics we see that we have similarly shaped,
uni-modal distributions with a minor right skew and are slightly platykurtic due to
our inherently bounded savings limits. While not normal (see Figure 4.37), they are
close enough that most of the analysis can be made with the assumption of normality
with minimal loss in accuracy. The departure from normality appears to be caused
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Figure 4.36: Histogram of Supply Chain Savings from Moving a Strong Buyer to a
Jointly Optimal Policy
Figure 4.37: Normality of Results for SB and SS
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by our lower limit of 0% savings. Analyses were repeated with data transformations.
These transformations provided negligible improvement in predictive ability while
adding difficulty to interpretation and are therefore omitted from this analysis.
From the above summary statistics, we see that a vast range of savings are pos-
sible with the ranges of parameters used. The problem for a third party is finding
a reliable method to predict these potential savings so that money and effort are
not wasted on ventures with small savings. We turn to stepwise and best subsets
multiple regression in an effort to best predict savings based on the values known to
all parties. Initial screenings were performed with all reciprocals, squares, and their
cross-products, plus various ad-hoc combinations of the known decision variables to
find promising candidates with explanatory power. These candidates were further
narrowed using best subsets to find the best possible compromise between number
of variables and explanatory power. The results of this analysis for a Strong Buyer
case are summarized in Table 4.11. From this table, we can note that just three
predictors, all forms of nSqS
nBqB
, can explain more than 70% of the variation of saving
percentages. This ratio of preferred contract quantities is shown to be both a simple
and surprisingly powerful predictor. Assuming the 3PC requires a 30% savings to
justify participation, we can test the performance of the regression in predicting prof-
its. These results are summarized in Table 4.12 with 500 random samples presented
in Figure 4.38.
The process was repeated for a Strong Supplier case with the results shown in
Table 4.13. Again, we see a high ability to accurately predict savings. Unfortunately,
an explanation of the predictors is not as simple as for the SB case. The ratio of
desired contract sizes is still important, but overtaken by the raw values of preferred
delivery sizes. Note that due to these being unscaled values, we would expect these
to need modification based on the scale involved in the scenario, despite the rather
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Table 4.11: Best Subsets Regression for Strong Buyer
Predictors R2 R2 (Pred.) S nSqS
nBqB
(
nSqS
nBqB
)2 ( nSqS
nBqB
)3 ( nSqS
nBqB
)4
1 57.5 57.3 0.12 x
2 68.6 68.1 0.10 x x
3 73.5 73.1 0.09 x x x
4 75.2 74.9 0.09 x x x x
Table 4.12: Performance of 3PC’s Prediction for SB
Average Savings % Number of Occurrences
Correctly Accept 46.0% 4440
Correctly Reject 17.6% 4043
Missed Opportunity 25.2% 705
Overestimated Profit 36.7% 712
Perfect Information 46.7%
Using Prediction 45.0%
Figure 4.38: Actual Savings Percentages against Predicted Savings for 500 Random
Samples
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Table 4.13: Best Subsets Regression for Strong Supplier
Predictors R2 R2 (Pred.) S qB qS nSqSnBqB
D
nBqB
nBqB
D
qS
1 23.6 23.6 0.13 x
2 38.6 38.6 0.11 x x
3 52.0 52.0 0.10 x x x
4 58.8 58.7 0.09 x x x x
5 62.1 62.0 0.09 x x x x x
6 64.6 64.0 0.09 x x x x x x
Table 4.14: Performance of 3PC’s Prediction for SS
Average Savings % Number of Occurrences
Correctly Accept 39.3% 2285
Correctly Reject 17.5% 5912
Missed Opportunity 25.0% 1000
Overestimated Profit 34.0% 703
Perfect Information 41.5%
Using Prediction 39.0%
large range used in the simulation. The fourth largest predictor can be interpreted as
the strong buyer’s desirable “contracts per year”. The fifth and sixth predictors are
simply the buyer’s requested contract size and deliveries per year, respectively. Again,
assuming a third party requires at least 30% savings to justify participation, we test
the performance of the regression in predicting profits. These results are summarized
in Table 4.39 with 500 random samples displayed in Figure 4.39.
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Figure 4.39: Actual Savings Percentages against Predicted Savings for 500 Random
Samples
4.5.5 Summary of Numerical Analyses and Practitioner Guidelines
A number of important conclusions can be drawn from the numerical analyses.
First, we can see that a strong prediction ability for potential savings, for either
a Strong Buyer or Strong Supplier scenario, lends reassurance that large savings
opportunities are not difficult to notice to the observant practitioner. For example,
we simply need to know each party’s preferred contract size (and thus, length) to
predict the possible savings from coordinating a Strong Buyer case. Next, from the
investigation into the relationship of commitment cost rates (LB/LS), we know that
lower savings can be expected for a relatively low LB or a relatively high LS (see
Figure 4.27). This aligns perfectly with our prediction from the sensitivity analysis
of this ratio. The intuition is fairly straightforward since a buyer with a low LB will
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prefer longer contracts (better aligning with the supplier), and a supplier with a high
LS will prefer shorter contracts (better aligning with the buyer).
4.6 Selected Algebraic Analysis
For a strong supplier, if we relax the integer requirement, disregard the supplier’s
cost of commitment, and focus on the limited scenario of m=1, we can gain some
insight for comparing cooperative and non-cooperative costs. The assumption of
m=1 and disregarding the strong supplier’s opportunity cost is not unreasonable in
the case of a strong supplier with ample capacity. Specifically, we know that if LS = 0
and D
P
< .5, then m=1 (Kelle et al., 2007). Since m=1, we can also consolidate ZS
into AS without loss of generality. For fair comparison, we can similarly limit our
scope to where mJ = 1. For this scenario, the (relaxed) joint optimals are:
n̂J =
√
AB
√
hSD + hBP√
PLBCB
√
ZB +AS
(4.11)
and
q̂J =
1
n̂J
√
2ABD
LBCB
=
√
2PD
√
ZB +AS√
hSD + hBP
(4.12)
thus the jointly optimal contract size will be
n̂J q̂J =
√
2ABD
LBCB
. (4.13)
The minimal total cost to the supply chain in this scenario is therefore:
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TCJ = √
2LBCBABD +
√
ZB + AS√
2
√
hSD + hBP
√
D
P
+
√
ZB + AS
√
D
2
√
hSD + hBP
(
hB
√
P + hSD√
P
)
. (4.14)
Note the various forms of D
P
observed throughout the equation.
We can compare this cost to the non-cooperative case. The strong supplier (SS)
will determine the delivery quantity with its EOQ:
q̂S =
√
2ASP
hS
. (4.15)
The buyer will respond by setting the optimal number of deliveries:
n̂B =
1
q̂S
√
2ABD
LBCB
=
√
ABDhS
LBCBASP
. (4.16)
This yields a minimal total cost to the supply chain in this scenario of:
TCSS =
√
2LBCBABD +
ZBD√
2
√
hS
PAS
+D
√
2AShS
P
+ hB√
2
√
ASP
hS
. (4.17)
Note that the first term is the same for both the jointly optimal and strong supplier
scenarios. Finally, we can subtract these costs to determine the potential gain from
moving a strong supplier to a jointly optimal partnership:
TCDIFF = TCSS − TCJ =
DhSZB + 2DAShS + hBPAS√
2PAShS
−
√
ZB + AS
√
hSD + hBP
√
2D
P
. (4.18)
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Note there are no longer LB, CB, or AB terms in this equation. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, this tells us that the savings is independent of the buyer’s ordering cost.
However, with further consideration, we can see that the first three terms, all buyer
terms, were used in determining the number of deliveries for both scenarios. We
can show that this difference is always positive with just one additional assumption.
Differentiating the above equation (TCDIFF ) with respect to any of the six terms,
equating to 0, and solving for that variable can be rearranged to this unity expressing
the condition for minimum savings:
1 = P
D
hB
hS
AS
ZB
. (4.19)
This is the same result we get from equating the two costs (zero savings). Moving
from left to right ratios on the right hand side of the equation, we know that P > D
and regularly assume hB > hS since parts gain value as they move down the supply
chain. This only leaves us with the final term to reconcile. Supplier setup costs are
typically large compared to receiving costs of the buyer. Further, recall that AS,
the supplier’s setup cost, as used here also includes ZS. Therefore, we are almost
guaranteed that AS > ZB. By simply adding this last conservative inequality as an
assumption, we can affirmatively state that any deviation from unity will be positive,
thus increasing the potential savings by moving to a jointly optimal policy. In other
words, we now know that as any or all of these ratios decrease, our savings will
increase since there is no possibility of offsetting changes to the parameters.
Since this analysis relies on relaxed variables for n and q, we may expect different
results when the optimization is applied with integers. To test this expectation, an
additional scenario (see Table 4.16) with 10,000 test cases based on values inspired
by Kelle et al. (2007) was run. From these results, 5445 cases where D
P
< .5 or m=1
are analyzed for performance.
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Table 4.15: Scenario Parameters for Assessing Analytical Performance
Parameter Scenario 4
P Unif(200,1600)
D Unif(.01,.99)∗P
ZB Unif(50,200)
AB Unif(50,200)
CB Unif(100,200)
rB Unif(0.05,0.3)
LB Unif(0.01,0.05)
ZS Unif(5,500)
AS Unif(100,1000)
CS Unif(40,100)
rS Unif(0.05,0.25)
otcS 0
LS 0
hB = rB ∗ CB
hS = rS ∗ CS
Table 4.16: Performance of Analytical Solution in Scenario 3
Cases where... Metric # Predicted $ # Predicted $ Total> Realized $ < Realized $
m=1 Count 1753 1097 2850
D
P < .5 Count 2177 2796 4973
m=1 AND DP < .5 Count 1305 1073 2378
Cases where... Metric Predicted Savings Realized Savings Difference
m=1 Average 1899.81 1826.52 -73.3
Std Deviation 1390.05 1615.82 462.7
D
P < .5
Average 3324.34 3482.94 158.6
Std Deviation 2625.95 2970.05 534.3
m=1 AND DP < .5
Average 2016.24 2025.80 9.6
Std Deviation 1436.31 1642.47 442.9
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Figure 4.40: Histogram of Differences from Predicted Savings to Realized Savings
From Table 4.16, we see that the relaxed predicted savings, on average, is within
5% of the realized savings. Further, if we examine the difference between the number
of times where we overpredicted savings where “m=1” against the more conservative
“m=1 AND D
P
< .5”, we can calculate that cases where a strong supplier, with
m=1 and .5 < D
P
< 1, will overpredict the potential savings by a ratio of more than
18:1. Conversely, when we drop the m=1 requirement, we see the opposite effect,
and underpredict the savings by a ratio of 2:1. Unfortunately, when we consider the
relatively large standard deviations, we see that there are quite a few times when the
prediction fails us, either high or low. To better examine this effect, the histogram of
the case when “m=1 and .5 < D
P
< 1” is presented in Figure 4.40.
We can see a rather slight right skew of 1.05 in this histogram of the differences
(Realized $ - Predicted $). The difference is roughly centered over 0, reassuring us
that the prediction is quite accurate on average. However, the variance in the results
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warns us that we should only use the analysis based on relaxed figures only for a
rough estimate of the potential savings.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
There are certainly many examples of an extremely strong party, known to us
by both common experience and the literature (examples of which were discussed in
Chapter 2). It is not the assertion of this thesis that this is more or less common
than having an only slightly stronger party, one that would not be able to fully
and unquestionably dictate all decisions as was considered in much of this research.
However, we know that stronger parties will commonly use any available strength to
negotiate more favorable contract terms at the expense of the larger supply chain,
making this an important research area. Numerous coordination mechanisms have
been offered in an attempt to minimize this inefficiency. However, from research and
experience we know there are many limits to this approach. Even if implemented
to some degree, perhaps with a quantity discount, it lacks the close collaboration
associated with a cooperative solution, something we know many practitioners would
prefer. Indeed, it is innately non-cooperative to use a coordination mechanism since
some level of coercion is inherent to the process of implementing a mechanism. On
the other hand, the literature exploring cooperative solutions, such as JELS, rarely
offer practical advice on how to proceed or overcome the many reservations preventing
closer collaboration. The goal of this research is to offer motivation, method, and some
guidance to a practical cooperative solution that includes joint cost minimization as
a benefit rather than a singular goal.
The solution to the above problem proposed by this thesis was through the novel
introduction and use of an expert third party. This third party is in a unique position
to offer many benefits, some financial with others less quantifiable. The most obvious
financial benefit is the guarantee of the jointly optimal policy being available. Other
significant benefits are possible as well. Supply chain partners, often wary of truly
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close collaboration for a host of reasons, have many reasons to embrace the concept
of a “buffer” party. This third party is in a position to not only help facilitate smooth
negotiations and avoid bitter feelings from the onset of the relationship, but can also
help resolve conflicts and assist in establishing a robust collaboration. This can be
done while keeping sensitive internal cost structures confidential from the trading
partner. However, to help realize this solution process, two things are required.
First, we need inclusive cost models that account for previously neglected subjects,
such as commitment costs and risk costs. This was done in Chapter 3 through the in-
troduction of buyer risk costs ∑
i
LBiVBi(n, q) and supplier risk costs
∑
i
LSiVSi(m,n, q).
The use of these cost components, while rather broad due to their nature, expand
upon previous research to address an often unspoken part of contract negotiations,
i.e. risk considerations in contracts. To aid in the application of these cost factors, an
example delineation of the buyer’s risk cost (i.e. LBCB nq2 ) was demonstrated to have
a cost rate, LB , equivalent to the probability of an abrupt end of demand, easing
interpretation for practitioners.
Second, a willing and able third party is the vehicle of execution to provide many
of the desired benefits of collaboration. Although numerous benefits are possible, the
limits and consequences of a self-interested third party were considered. Of significant
concern is the possibility of a conflict-of-interest stemming from manipulation of the
optimal policy. This is relieved through the recommendation of a basic incentive sys-
tem, basing remuneration for the third party on a proportion of the achieved savings.
Facing this recommendation, an interested third party will want to accurately predict
the potential savings in a supply chain contract negotiation. A large numerical anal-
ysis was conducted to investigate the ability of the 3PC to predict possible savings,
and thus compensation. The findings provide evidence that it may well be possible
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to provide a relatively good estimate of savings based only on the commonly known
terms at the time of negotiation.
Comparing a third party solution to a traditional coordination mechanism ap-
proach might at first seem unfair. After all, we are guaranteed equal or better results
with every coordination effort when using a third party. However, there is a cost to
close collaboration. For simple contracts with common or low-value items, we concede
it could be hard to justify the extra expense and complication of involving a third
party. But, for unique or high-value items, where significant differences in desired
policies exist, we have shown that there are significant savings available to those that
are willing to invest the time and effort required to cooperate.
5.1 Extensions and Future Areas of Research
The results of this research encourage further investigations of the overlooked
area of the buyer’s and supplier’s risk and opportunity costs. The current research
considered the possibility of an abrupt end-of-demand event during the execution of
the contract. An alternative scenario worth considering is a potential demand shift,
rather than an end, throughout the contract period.
Obviously, countless delineations of ∑
i
LBiVBi(n, q) and
∑
i
LSiVSi(m,n, q) are pos-
sible. Industry-specific values and guidance could prove beneficial to practitioners.
Dropping the integer ratio requirement for number of shipments per production
run and number of shipments would allow for better joint performance. This could be
accomplished in two ways. First, we could allow the supplier to carry stock between
production runs, allowing for a surplus to cover a partial batch at the end. This adds
considerable complications to the model as the average supplier inventory calculation
becomes more involved. Second, we could allow for the last run to be shorter than
the rest. Of course, this would also complicate the model in a similar way.
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Allowing for multiple products in the optimal policy could provide synergistic
benefits, but with added complications such as accounting for synchronized deliveries.
Similarly, including stochastic parameters, like demand, would add significant realism
for many applications.
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Appendix A: List of Notation
Note on use of notation in this thesis: All formulas and models created by other
authors are presented, when possible, with notation consistent with the rest of this
thesis without explanation or exposition. Unique terminology is described at the time
it is used.
Table A.1: Summary of Buyer’s Model Parameters
Parameter Description Example Value(s)
ZB
The cost to buyer to receive a shipment from the
supplier. Includes inspection and buyer handling
costs.
$1/shipment
D
The constant demand rate predicted by the
buyer throughout the planning horizon. 1000 units/time unit
AB
The buyer’s one-time fixed ordering cost per
contract. $225/order
CB
The buyer’s unit purchase cost, committed to at
the time of contract. $20/unit
ĈB
The updated but not chargeable buyer’s unit cost
experienced during fixed-price contract execution. $20/unit
CB
The unsalvageable value for committed but
unusable units remaining on contract presented
as a cost to buyer.
$20/unit
rB
The buyer’s inventory holding cost rate per time
unit. 0.2/time unit
hB
The buyer’s per-unit inventory holding cost per
time unit where hB = CBrB .
$4/time unit/unit
LBi
The buyer’s ith commitment rate per time unit
where i ∈ Z+. .05/time unit
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Table A.2: Summary of Supplier’s Model Parameters
Parameter Description Example Value(s)
ZS
The fixed cost to the supplier to send a shipment
to the buyer. Includes shipping and supplier
handling costs.
$4.5/shipment
P
The constant production rate predicted by the
supplier throughout the planning horizon. 2500 units/time unit
AS
The supplier’s fixed setup cost per production
run. $1000/batch
CS The supplier’s unit cost. $10/unit
rS
The supplier’s inventory holding rate per time
unit. 0.2/time unit
hS
The supplier’s per-unit inventory holding cost
per time unit where hS = CSrS .
$2/time unit/unit
LSi
The supplier’s ith commitment rate per time unit
where i ∈ Z+. .05/time unit
OTCS
All one-time costs per contract to supplier (e.g.
negotiation or tooling). Comparable to AB .
$1000/contract
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Table A.3: Summary of Supply Chain Decision Variables
Decision
Variable Description Example Value(s)
q The shipment size throughout the entire contract 100 units
n The total number of shipments in the contract. 15 shipments
m The number of shipments per production run 5 shipments
nB , qB The buyer’s optimal n and q, respectively -
mS , nS , qS The supplier’s optimal m, n, and q, respectively -
mJ , nJ , qJ The jointly optimal m, n, and q, respectively -
m̂S Optimal m with integer requirement relaxed 4.13 shipments
Table A.4: Summary of Functions of Decision Variables
Decision
Variable
Description Example Value(s)
nq The total contract quantity 1500 units
mq The supplier’s production run quantity. 500 units
Vk(m,n, q)
The ad-hoc occurrence cost or value of event k, as a
function of decision variables m, n, and q $1000/event
∑
i
VBi(n, q)
Summation of all buyer’s commitment cost values denoted
by Bi and indexed by i, as a function of decision variables
n, and q
CB
nq
2
∑
i
VSi(m,n, q)
Summation of all supplier’s commitment cost values
denoted by Si and indexed by i, as a function of decision
variables m, n, and q
CS
nq
2
133
Vita
Kurt Alden Masten was born in West Chester, Pennsylvania in April 1977. He
completed a Bachelor of Science in Industrial Engineering at the Pennsylvania State
University in 1999 and a Ph.D. in Business Administration with a concentration in
Decision Sciences in 2016 from Drexel University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His
work experience includes 10 years as a manufacturing engineer and 3 years as a college
instructor. He has published in the International Journal of Production Economics
and conference proceedings.
Kurt A. Masten is currently an Assistant Professor of Supply Chain Management
at Fairleigh Dickinson University in Florham Park, New Jersey.

